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Abstract
All since the rise of the first civilizations, economic development has been
closely intertwined with the evolution of states. In this paper, we contribute
to the literature on state history and long-run economic development in four
ways. First, we extend and complete the state history index from Bockstette,
Chanda and Putterman (2002) by coding the experience with states from the
first state origins, 3500 BCE, up until 2000 CE. Second, we explore empirically
the relationship between time since transition to agriculture and state age,
as well as subsequent state history. Our estimated unconditional correlation
implies that a 1000 year earlier transition to agriculture is associated with a
470 years earlier emergence of state institutions. We show how this relationship
differs between indigenously- and externally- originated states. Third, we show
that the relationship between our extended state history index and current levels
of economic development has the shape of an inverted u. The results reflect the
fact that countries that were home to the oldest states, such as Iraq, Egypt and
China, are poorer today than younger inheritors of their civilizations, such as
Germany, Denmark and Japan. This pattern was already in place by 1500 CE
and is robust to adjusting for migrations during the colonial era. Finally, we
demonstrate a very close relationship between state formation and the adoption
of writing.
Keywords: State history, comparative development
JEL Codes: O11, O43, O50, N00
1 Introduction
History has shown that economic development often thrives in states where govern-
ments guarantee the rule of law and provide public goods for their citizens. In order
to reach a deeper understanding of why some countries have good government and
others do not, social scientists have become increasingly interested in studying the
long-run patterns of institutional development within states. The roots of countries’
∗We are grateful for useful comments from Carl-Johan Dalgaard, Jakob Gerner Hariri, and from
seminar participants at University of Copenhagen and Brown University. We also thank Taewan
Roh and Nicholas Carter for valuable research assistance.
†Corresponding author: Louis Putterman@brown.edu
1
contemporary failures or successes have often been traced back to “critical junctures“
far back in history.1
In this paper, we study the emergence of states from their first origin around
3500 BCE up until the present day and analyze how state development has in-
teracted with economic development. More specifically, we attempt to make four
distinct contributions to the literature. First, we complete the state history index
initially developed by Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) for 159 countries.
We extend the index from 1 CE backwards in time to the first origins of states
around 3500 BCE and also code the 1950-2000 CE period, which was previously
missing from the time series. Second, we use the complete index of state histories
to study the determinants of the timing of state emergence and experience. Our
estimates indicate a very strong and robust positive link between the time since the
transition to agriculture and state emergence, as well as state history. Moreover,
we explore the role of transition to agriculture and geographical characteristics in
states that emerged indigenously as opposed to by conquest. Third, we analyze
how our extended state history index correlates with various indicators of economic
development. In particular, we show that the relationship between our extended
state history index and current levels of economic development has the shape of an
inverted u, implying that the very young and very old states have the least devel-
oped economies whereas the richest countries have intermediate state history scores.
Lastly, our analysis is probably the first to document for a large cross-section of
countries a very strong connection between state emergence and the adoption of
writing.
The first of these objectives - the creation of a state history index for the BCE-
period - is perhaps the most important contribution that we make. In line with the
methodology in the original effort by Bockstette el al. (2002), we combine three
dimensions of state development: 1) The existence of a state above tribal level; 2)
Whether rule is internally or externally based; 3) The territorial coverage of the
state in relation to current national borders. Our main source of information is
Encyclopedia Britannica Online and the three indicators were coded for each of
the 159 countries in our sample and for each 50-year period from the origin of the
first states around 3500 BCE, yielding a panel data set with 17,490 country-period
observations. The details of the construction of the index are described further
below.
The work clearly involves several methodological challenges. For instance, how
should a state be defined? In this regard, we follow the tradition of Service (1962),
Carneiro (1981), Johnson and Earle (2000) and others, distinguishing between bands,
chiefdoms, and full-fledged states. Unlike the other forms of governments, states are
1See for instance North (1990), Acemoglu at al (2006 and 2012), and Besley and Persson (2009).
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further characterized by a centralized government with the ability to collect taxes,
enforce laws, and mobilize forces for war. Using this definition, most sources seem
to be in rough agreement about the time when states arise in different countries.
Accompanying this paper is an extensive online data appendix where we motivate
the coding for each country-period observation.
Another issue concerns the unit of analysis, which is the territory delimited by
modern-day country borders, for 159 contemporary countries in the sample. It is
a well-known fact that the borders of current countries sometimes have very lit-
tle resemblance with the geopolitical logic in ancient times.2 Furthermore, African
country borders were often drawn without consideration of indigenous state forma-
tions and several of the American countries have experienced an almost complete
replacement of their indigenous populations since the colonial era (Putterman and
Weil, 2010) while also having borders unrelated to pre-colonial realities.
However, to the extent that researchers are interested in tracking the histories of
countries in order to understand contemporary levels of development, the modern
configuration of countries is still a natural point of departure. A potential alternative
to using country borders could have been to divide the world into equal-sized grid
cells and then study the history of states in each such cell.3 This would entail a very
different type of analysis with its own methodological challenges. We leave this for
future work.
When we study the determinants of state emergence in a formal regression anal-
ysis, we demonstrate that the time since the adoption of agriculture alone explains
about 65 percent of the variation in state onset. The regression coefficient for the
unconditional association between state age and time since the Neolithic transi-
tion indicates that a 1000 year earlier transition implies a 470 years earlier state
emergence. When we include continental fixed effects and geographical controls,
the equivalent calculation gives us 430 years. The point estimate is a lot higher in
countries where states originated internally as opposed to by conquest.
The state history data that we extend here were initially compiled by Bockstette
et al. (2002) with the aim of using presence and duration of experience with macro
polities as one of several potential indicators of societal complexity and level of
technological advancement. Anthropologists including Service (1971), Johnson and
Earle (2000), and Richerson, Vila and Mulder (2001) have described a rough con-
tinuum of modes of social organization and economic adaptation which range from
foragers in which small bands are the principal social and political unit, to horticul-
2Although this is a valid critique of the approach used here, there are also numerous instances
of countries where states from their inception have evolved in close proximity to current borders.
Examples of such countries include Egypt, Norway, Sweden, China, and Japan.
3State history has been coded at the grid-cell level for sub-Saharan Africa after 1000 CE by
Depetris-Chauvin (2014).
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tural and pastoral groups organized as tribes, to intensive agricultural and industrial
societies marked by larger populations organized into macro political units that typ-
ically display greater economic specialization and social stratification than tribes or
bands. Presence of a large, domestically based state (as opposed to band or tribal
arrangements or an externally imposed empire) can thus be conjectured to serve as
an indicator of “level of development,” one having the advantage of relatively good
coverage in historical sources.
Bockstette et al. were interested in investigating the effect of early social and
technological development on post-Second World War economic growth rates, and
they assumed that the impact of very early experience would decay over time, so
they did not attempt to code information on state presence before 1 CE or after 1950.
They coded all countries with substantial populations for which relevant economic
growth and other indicators were available, resulting in a sample of 104 countries,
of which their analysis focused especially on 70 non-OECD member countries. They
found a significant and robust correlation between state history and recent growth
rate, and a significant bivariate correlation between state history and income level
that was not robust to addition of controls. Roughly the same data set was also
used by Chanda and Putterman (2005), and Chanda and Putterman (2007).
Bockstette et al.’s (2002) data were subsequently expanded to include more ex-
Communist countries (studied by Iliev and Putterman, 2007), more African countries
(studied by Cinyabuguma and Putterman, 2011), and a few other countries for
which complementary income or other required data had initially been viewed as
unreliable. With the larger data set, Putterman and Weil (2010) demonstrated that
ability of state history to predict current level of development is greatly strengthened
by replacing the state history that transpired on a given country’s territory by the
weighted average state history of the places in which current residents’ ancestors
lived in the past, an adjustment motivated by the large movements of populations
especially from “Old World” continents to the Americas, Australia and New Zealand
after 1500. Chanda, Cook and Putterman (2014) apply the same procedure to
demonstrate “persistence of fortune” of ancestral lines in former colonies that display
a “reversal of fortune” (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002) in the absence of
such ancestry and migration accounting.4
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we provide an overview of the
literature on the definition of a state and present the principles behind our data
collection. In section 3, we present and discuss a number of stylized patterns that
4The state history data have also been employed in a number of other studies, receiving focal
attention in Ang (2013a, 2013b), playing important roles in Ahlerup and Olsson (2012), Hariri
(2012), Ertan, Putterman and Fiszbein (2012), and Daniele (2013), and being included as a control
in a number of other studies. None of the above studies attempts to extend the information on
states to include the BCE years or fill in the last half of the 20th Century.
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emerge from the new data. In section 4, we carry out an econometric analysis of
the determinants of the timing of state emergence and the relationship between
economic development and state history. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
One of the contributions of this paper is the construction of a comprehensive index
of state history tracing political organization within the territories of modern-day
countries as far back as historical and archaeological evidence allow it. In doing so,
we build on the State Antiquity Index previously developed by Bockstette, Chanda
and Putterman (2002). This index and its subsequent versions were constructed
for up to 159 modern-day countries, covering a period between 1 CE and 1950
CE. However, for as many as 58 modern-day countries in the dataset, states had
emerged on their territories before the Common Era. For half of these, the state
history before 1 CE goes back at least eight centuries (e.g. Italy), and for some
even over three millenia (e.g. Iran, Egypt). Conceivably, this early state experience
may also have a long-lasting impact on the economic development of the regions
where it accumulated. In addition, no picture of the current distribution of wealth
in the world would be complete without accounting for the most recent historical
events, between 1950 and 2000. This period was marked by the mass decolonization
of African countries, the incidence of civil wars, and the expansion and contraction
of various spheres of political influence.
Therefore we have extended the state antiquity index in two directions. First,
we have coded the index for the territories of the 58 present-day countries for which
evidence suggests the emergence of statelike institutions before 1 CE; the added
periods of state history range from 14 years (e.g. Hungary) up to 3500 years (e.g.
Iraq) before 1 CE. Second, we have coded the index of state history for the 1950-2000
period for all 159 countries in the sample. The case of Iraq, for which we record
the longest state history of 5500 years, illustrates how we depart from the previous
versions of the index, which recorded 1950 years of state history only.
For these new additions we surveyed and summarized the events throughout the
states’ development and we mapped them into real numbers within 50-year periods,
according to the existing methodology.5 This generated a richness of longitudinal
information which is a useful resource for undertaking minute inspections into any
stage in the evolution of state institutions. Finally, appending the BCE to the
CE Statehist scores, we also computed the aggregate score for state history, from
state emergence to 2000 CE, as well as an aggregate score to 1500 CE and to 1 CE
5The previous State Antiquity Index, version 3, is presented at:
www.econ.brown.edu/fac/louis putterman/antiquity%20index.htm.
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(virtually any aggregation is possible).
Naturally, tracing the state evolution back to the millennia BCE entails pinning
down the dawn of states in history, which is a major undertaking, given the scarcity
of written records. Therefore, in recording the approximate date of state formation
in a consistent manner, we needed to resort to a set of conventions aligned with
the historical, political and anthropological understanding of the concept of “state”.
After clarifying what we refer to as “states“ below, we proceed to describe the actual
data coding protocol.
2.1 Defining the “state“
How do we know when a state has emerged? The first challenge stems from the
question of how to define the state, hardly a novel dilemma in social sciences. The
classical understanding of the “state“ comes from Weber (1919), who defined it as
an entity which “upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of phys-
ical force in the enforcement of its order” (Weber, 1978, p. 54). This implies that
we should be looking for evidence of the initial monopolization of power within a
certain territory. However, there is also the question of the extent of this origi-
nal jurisdiction: how large is the population or the territory subject to the power
monopoly? Is, for instance a village with 100 tribesmen, led by a chief, large enough
to classify as “state“? It appears that we need to find an appropriate threshold to
distinguish between small and large scale political organization. In some cases the
distinction is unambiguous: there are written records attesting the date when large-
scale centralized organization within the territory of certain modern-day countries
was originally attained. For instance, the land of what is today Belgium came under
large-scale political organization for the first time between 59 and 52 BCE, when
it was integrated in the Roman Empire, having been inhabited by people with no
more than tribal organization prior to 59 BCE. This is most often the case of states
originated in colonies or expansion of pre-existing states (we call these externally-
or non-indigenously- originated states). However, for territories in which the state
was an indigenous development, i.e. internally- or indigenously- originated states,
evidence of this transition is suggestive at best.6
Thus, the first task is to decide when to assign the first positive scores, marking
the emergence of large scale political organization. We take the first documented
manifestation of the presence of an overarching governing body, e.g. a local kingdom,
or rule by a colonial power, to yield the first positive score for the ruled territory.
Crucially, in order to qualify for a positive score, we adopt the convention that
6Internally originated states include both pristine states, where power centralization was a com-
pletely original development, as well as those with an indigenous but potentially externally-inspired
origin.
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the evidence should point to a type of political organization above the tribal level.
This principle is not arbitrary, but is in fact consistent with established sociological
and anthropological taxonomies of human societies throughout their evolution. For
instance, Johnson and Earle (2000) proposed a division of societies into local group
(further divided into family, village and the Big Man group) and regional polity,
which can be a chiefdom or a state. This distinction was necessary to separate the
small-scale organization of local groups from the next level of political organization
- with the chiefdom at the lower bound. This distinction goes back even earlier,
owing to Service’s (1962) proposed typology of bands/tribes/chiefdoms/states. An
additional indication of how to identify state institutions comes from Charles Tilly,
who understood the state to be “a coercion-wielding organization that. . . exercises
clear priority over all organizations within substantial territories. The term therefore
includes city-states, empires, theocracies, and many other forms of government, but
excludes tribes.” (Tilly, 1990, p. 1).7
In practice, however, following this principle is not always straightforward. In
some cases we could rely on written history to assign a date for state onset (e.g. in
the case of Syria, the Ebla tablets dated 2600-2500 BCE document the existence of
a flourishing Syrian kingdom). In other instances we had to rely on archaeological
data, which compelled us to consider any evidence of emerging political or admin-
istrative cohesion above tribal level as an indication that a governing body came
into existence. Accordingly, we sometimes followed a “diagnostic traits” approach,
having to consider material manifestations, or consequences of monopolization of
power, as an “archaeological confirmation of the process of state formation” (Jones
and Kautz, 1981, pp. 16-17). These material manifestations can be monumental
structures, such as palaces, temples or large urban settlements etc. In the case of
Iraq, for instance, there is the transition from small to large urban centers with
grand architectural structures such as Uruk in the middle of the 4th millennium
BCE. Admittedly, the drawback of this “symptomatic“ approach is that it blurs the
boundary between state and civilization and it is susceptible to misclassifying an
emerging or transient civilization into a state in the Weberian sense.
The second task is to recognize and mark the transition from chiefdom to fully-
fledged state. Following the paradigm of the evolution of pristine states from chief-
doms (see e.g. Carneiro 1981, Earle 1987, Flannery 1995, Marcus 1992, Spencer
1990, Spencer and Redmond 2004), we mark this distinction in our data by assigning
the following values: Band/tribe is marked by a rule score of 0, paramount chief-
dom is assigned 0.75 and fully-fledged state receives the value 1. Robert Carneiro
is a staunch proponent of the intermediary role of the paramount chiefdom as the
evolutionary link between the stage of autonomous bands or tribes and the state. In
7We thank Jacob Gerner Hariri for useful references on the matter of state definition.
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his definition, the paramount chiefdom is “an autonomous political unit comprising
a number of villages or communities under the permanent control of a paramount
chief” (Carneiro, 1981, p. 45), while the state is “an autonomous political unit,
encompassing many communities within its territory and having a centralized gov-
ernment with the power to collect taxes, draft men for work or war, and decree
and enforce laws” (Carneiro, 1970, p. 733). Although simple chiefdoms fall short of
the notion of supra-tribal polity, paramount chiefdom which incorporates multiple
individually substantial chiefdoms can be understood as a form of incipient state.
Hence we decided to begin according partial weight when a polity reaches this level.
While it is difficult to know exactly where the chiefdom ends and where the state
begins, we have made efforts to draw a sensible line where the evidence suggests a
remarkable evolution in socio-political organization. Such is the case of Mexico,
where we assign a score of 0.75 to the period 450 - 100 BCE for the early urban
settlements at Chiapas and Oaxaca. We then raise this score to 1 in 100 BCE when
large-scale urban growth at Teotihuacan and the development of previously missing
institutions such as a standing army warrant the status of fully-fledged state. While
this kind of judgement is not uncontroversial, it is the most feasible approach given
limited documentary resources. We further detail the assignment of scores in the
next section.
2.2 Constructing the index
The construction of the index for the BCE period follows the same principles devel-
oped by Bockstette et al (2002):
1. For every modern-day country in the sample, we survey the historical and
archaeological evidence to identify the time of emergence of the first state
institutions on the territory of the respective country (in accordance with the
ground rules outlined above). We divide the time following that date into
50-year periods, or half centuries. The oldest state, established on the land of
today’s Iraq, is assigned 70 periods from 3500 BCE until 1 CE and 110 periods
in total, including 1 - 2000 CE. Therefore 3500 BCE is the joint starting point
of our analysis for all countries. In the case of Bulgaria, for instance, initial
presence of supra-tribal rule is attested from 516 BCE. Hence the first period
with positive scores is 550 – 501 BCE whereas all previous periods have a zero
score.
2. For each modern-day country i and 50-year period, indexed by t, we classify
the information regarding the state experience within that time frame into 3
major components, indicated by the superscript c. Hence, zcit is the score for
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component c in country i for period t. The score is based on the following
questions:
(a) Is there a government above the tribal level? This first score component,
z1it is assigned 1 point if the answer is yes, 0.75 points if the organization
of the state can at best be described as a paramount chiefdom, and 0
points if the answer is no.8
(b) Is this government foreign or locally based? The second component z2it is
assigned 1 point if the rule is locally based, 0.5 points if foreign, i.e., the
country is a colony, and 0.75 if the rule is exercised by a local government
with substantial foreign oversight.9
(c) How much of the territory of the modern country was ruled by this gov-
ernment? The third component z3it is assigned a score as follows: 1 if more
than 50 percent of the territory comprising the modern country is under
some rule of a given state during the given 50-year period; 0.75 points
if the ruled territory is between 25 percent and 50 percent; 0.5 points
if the ruled territory is between 10 percent and 25 percent; 0.3 points if
less than 10 percent of the territory is under some rule. In cases where
substantial parts of the territory were under the rule of distinct states,
we downgrade the z3it score to the next possible value (e.g. if more than
50 percent of the territory is under the rule of one state, then z3it = 1,
but if the same proportion of the territory is divided between two states,
z3it = 0.75).
3. We denote every 50-year period from 1951-2000 CE back to 3500 BCE by t
where t = 0 is the most recent period and t = 109 for 3500-3451 BCE. For
each t on the territory of country i, we compute a composite State index score
by multiplying the three components by one another and by 50:
sit = z
1
it · z2it · z3it · 50 (1)
If changes in the structure/origin/territory of the rule incurred within a 50-
year window, the period t was subdivided into subperiods θ = 1, 2, 3... such
that z1itθ would be the sub-period scores for component 1 in country i during
8In some special cases, we assign special values such as 0.5 for z1it due to of radical uncertainty
with respect to the existence of rule on certain territory. The reader is referred to the online data
appendix for a more detailed discussion of coding exceptions.
9In some cases where a given territory is divided into multiple powers with different rule origins,
z2it is assigned a simple average of the basic scores corresponding to those origins. For instance,
0.875 is the average of the 1 and 0.75, for a territory with one part locally-based rule and one part
locally-based with foreign oversight.
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50-year period t and subperiod θ. The overall score sit was then computed as
the weighted average of the sub-period scores:
sit = 50 ·
[
(z1it1 · z2it1 · z3it1) · wit1 + (z1it2 · z2it2 · z3it2) · wit2 + · · ·
]
(2)
The weights witθ are obtained by dividing the number of years in each sub-
period θ by 50. By applying these formulas we obtain a score sit for every half
century from 3500 BCE to 1950-2000 CE.
4. By joining the BCE- with the preexisting CE-era series, we obtain a complete
description of the history of state presence for every modern-day country. In
a small number of cases, harmonizing the scores around 1 CE required adjust-
ments to the initial CE index. However, changes were minor and the correla-
tion between the original and the new scores for the period 1 CE - 1950 CE
is over 99 percent. The final aggregation of all 50-year scores sit leads to one
comprehensive index of the cumulative state history - Statehist - for country
i, calculated using various rates ρ ≥ 0 for discounting historical scores. The
index is normalized by putting in the denominator the score of a hypothetical
state with full discounted scores between 3500 BCE and the period of interest
τ :
Siτ =
∑109
t=τ (1 + ρ)
τ−t · sit∑109
t=τ (1 + ρ)
τ−t · 50 (3)
This cumulative Statehist index Siτ , which ranges between 0 and 1 and should
be carefully distinguished from the ”flow” State index observations sit during
each individual time period, can be calculated at virtually any point in history
τ = {0, 1, ...109}. Although the contemporary level of the Statehist index
for 2000 CE (Si0) is what we are primarily interested in, we calculate it also
for 1500 CE (i.e. 10 periods back such that τ = 10), and for 1 CE (i.e.
when τ = 40). The choice of discount factor ρ warrants some discussion. The
previous literature has set the convention at ρ = 0.05, in light of the reasonable
assumption that the more distant past matters less today than recent history.
With the additional data, however, a 5 percent discount rate gives insufficient
weight to the long stream of sit-scores before 1 CE when the aggregation is
done at 2000 CE or even at 1500 CE. In fact, applying this discount rate would
lead to an extended Statehist score that has a correlation of up to 99.3 percent
with the 5 percent discounted 1 - 1950 CE score. The implication is that all
information before 1 CE would receive negligible weight. While it of course
remains to be seen below just how useful placing weight on the distant past
will be, our convention in what follows will be to employ the 1 percent discount
10
factor of the normalized Statehist score in the forthcoming analyses.10
To answer the three questions (a-c) above in a manner that is consistent across
periods, we relied mainly on information in the Encyclopedia Britannica Online.
We detail on the data sources and illustrate the coding process and further data
aggregations in the online Appendix B.
3 Patterns of state evolution
In this section, we will present some of the key stylized patterns that arise from the
complete state history time series introduced in this paper. Our purpose is to get
a feel for the data and potentially some perspective on the role of state history in
economic development.
The first key pattern concerns the evolution of states in the world as a whole:
The evolution of state institutions in the world follows approximately an exponential
upward trend with periods of rapid growth punctuated by periods of stagnation.
Figure 1
This pattern is visualized in Figure 1 which shows the log of the aggregated
percentage score for all contemporary countries in our sample at each 50-year period
on the vertical axis and year on the horizontal axis. The percentage score in period
t is calculated as State index world (t) = 100 ·∑Ni=1 sit/ (N · 50) where N = 159 is
the number of included countries and where sit ∈ [0, 50] is the state history score for
country i during 50-year interval t, as described above.11 A value close to 0 percent
in this world index indicates that there is no sign of state presence in any of the
included countries in period t whereas a score of 100 means that all 159 countries
reach the maximum value sit = 50 in our state measure during that period. Since
many modern-day countries did not have full states in the spirit of our definition
during the entirety of last time period 1950-2000, the aggregate percentage in the
graph is about 88 percent (ln 88 = 4.48) at the end of the time series.12
The logged percentage score for the world crawls around a fitted log-linear trend
line. A simple regression of the aggregate world state index score on time shows that
the fit is R2 = 0.90. However, it is also clear that several periods are characterized
by rapid state evolution whereas other periods are marked by a general decline. The
10The correlation between the 1 percent discounted Statehist index calculated for the year 2000
and the 1 - 1950 CE 1 percent discounted Statehist index is 0.93. The correlation between the
former and the 1 - 1950 CE 5 percent discounted Statehist index is 0.86.
11Note that State index world(t) describes the ”flow” level of state development in the world in
period t and not the cumulative ”stock” of state experience.
12Many states were de-colonized part way through the period, a number emerged from the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia, others experienced contending governments or state failure, etc.
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first boom in state emergence appears already 3500-2300 BCE, which then ends with
a long period of stagnation. The other major stagnations in the figure happened
around 1750 BCE, 1200 BCE, and 400 CE. A second period of rapid growth was 850
BCE-1 CE during the Iron Age. From just after the collapse of the Roman empire
around 450 CE, aggregate state emergence has shown a steady upward trend.
The aggregated graph summarizing the state history for the world as a whole in
Figure 1 hides important differences among the major agricultural core regions. In
Figure 2, we disaggregate the evolution of state history into the four main agricul-
tural core areas: Western, Eastern Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Americas.13
These four areas are created on the basis of how Neolithic agriculture and civiliza-
tion spread during early historical times. We also show the trend for the world as a
whole. The important Western area, for instance, comprises all modern-day coun-
tries in Europe, North Africa, Middle East, Central Asia, Iran, Pakistan and India,
including the early civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt. People in this region
adopted the agricultural production package from the Fertile Crescent, including
domesticated crops like wheat and barley and animals like goats and sheep, and the
states came into frequent contact at least from the 1st millennium BCE onwards.14
Figure 2
When we divide up the world in this way, some striking historical differences
between the regions appear: State evolution started earliest in the Western area, with
Eastern Asia lagging behind until rough convergence (indeed, initially overtaking)
around 500 CE, with the other regions gaining steam later and all converging only
toward the end of the era of European colonialism.
On the vertical axis in Figure 2 is the State index (in percent) for the countries
included in the different categories, but unlike in Figure 1, we do not log the time
series this time. As noted above, state emergence was earliest in Eastern Asia and
in the Western region. Interestingly, both of these early civilizations took off on a
more rapid path after 850 BCE. By the time of the Western Roman collapse after
450 CE, Asian state development overtakes the Western one for the first time.15
13The division into agricultural core areas follows the practice in Morris (2010) and Olsson and
Paik (2013). Combining the two or three distinct agricultural cores of the Americas identified by
some writers is a convenient simplification.
14We draw the boundary between the Western and core region Eastern Asia on the border between
India and Bangladesh. India has clearly been influenced by both Western and Eastern traditions,
although its earliest civilization in the Indus Valley was of Western origin. The Americas are
generally regarded as having had three agricultural core areas in North, Central and South America.
Agricultural practices in Sub-Saharan Africa spread in the Sahel and in the West African cradle of
the Bantu expansion. See Bellwood (2005) for an exhaustive account of the Neolithic transition.
15See Morris (2010) for a detailed comparative analysis of Western and Eastern history since the
Neolithic.
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The other two regions, the Americas and Sub-Saharan Africa, clearly lag behind,
in particular after the Eurasian turning point 850 BCE. From about 500 CE, the
pace of state emergence starts to increase in Sub-Saharan Africa. When the colonial
era starts in the late 15th century CE, the lagging regions experience a dramatic
increase in the State index. This increase is of course to a great extent driven by
the emergence of colonial states, created by European powers. By the final period
of observation (1951-2000), the Americas has the highest score on state presence
among all regions in the world.
In Figure C1 in the online appendix, we zoom in on the last 550 years of state
history. This period of colonization witnessed some dramatic reversals in terms of
economic and political development (Acemoglu et al, 2002 and Hariri, 2013).16 One
striking observation is that the territories that constitute today’s Western offshoot
countries displayed no signs of state emergence until the 1550-1600 period, placing
them last among the regions in the initial centuries. After 1750, state development
took off in these countries and reached 100 percent in the 1950-2000 interval. Latin
America & Caribbean experienced a similar increase and also had a particularly
quick development after 1750. Eastern Asia, on the other hand, had a long decline
from the late 1600s which was not halted until the 20th century.17 Africa had a state
history index on par with West and Central Asia in the latter half of the 1800s but
diverged as a result of the European scramble for African colonies in the 1880-1900
period. Decolonization after 1960 then brought convergence in levels of local state
presence between Africa and the other regions.
4 Putting the data to work: Initial explorations
Having constructed and provided an initial description of our data, we are now ready
to explore its usefulness in some initial empirical exercises. This section is organized
around three major areas of analysis. In the first subsection, we study the determi-
nants of the origin of states and duration of state history. In the second subsection,
we analyze the relationship between state history and current economic development.
In the third, we investigate the relationship between state history and indicators of
historical economic development: population density, level of urbanization, general
technological sophistication, and the emergence of writing.
16In the graph, we have divided the world up into Europe, Eastern Asia, West and Central Asia,
Latin America & the Caribbean, Africa and Western offshoots (Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and the United States). For this later period, we argue it is reasonable to split up the Western area
so that the largely Muslim West and Central Asia is a category of its own. Furthermore, countries
such as United States and Canada had a very distinct history from the other parts of the Americas,
which we refer to as Latin America & Caribbean.
17This was due to the fact that the modern territories of Indonesia and Sri Lanka were colonized
by Europeans while for instance the government of Laos was increasingly dominated by foreign
Asian powers.
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4.1 State origins and persistence
In this section we explore the relationship between the timing of the transition to Ne-
olithic agriculture and the date of state origins. It has been generally acknowledged
in the literature that the adoption of an agricultural technology for food produc-
tion, based on domesticated plants and animals, was also associated with a sedentary
lifestyle, a dramatic increase in population density, and a socially stratified society
with a dominant elite controlling a surplus from food production (Diamond, 1997;
Johnson and Earle, 2000; Peregrine et al, 2007; Petersen and Skaaning, 2010). In
such dense agricultural societies, chiefdoms eventually evolved into states with an
ability to tax their population and to draft men for war or for the construction of
extensive public works such as temples, irrigation systems, and city walls. Roughly
5,000 years after the first emergence of agriculture in the “Fertile Crescent“ in the
Middle East, the first known state appeared in Uruk around 3,500 BCE. China,
Mesoamerica, and the Andes all likewise appear as cases in which a more-or-less in-
dependent flowering of agriculture was followed many centuries later by the pristine
emergence of states. How is the emergence of agriculture and that of states linked
statistically on a global scale? Is this link the same in states originated internally
as opposed to by conquest?
As our baseline setup, we use a multiple linear regression model with a measure
of state experience as the dependent variable:
Statei = α0 + α1 ·Agyearsi + α′j · Zi + α′k ·Xi + i (4)
In the equation above, the dependent variable is measured in two ways: 1) State
age - the number of years elapsed in 2000 CE since a state/chiefdom first came
into existence in the territory of modern-day country i. By using this variable we
capture the timing of the actual state emergence in the regression. 2) Statehist (Siτ )
– the cumulative state history index of the country evaluated at period τ , using a
1 percent time discount rate. This variable thus captures the experience with state
institutions since the first emergence of a state on the country’s territory (in terms
of autonomy as well as territorial coverage and unity of the rule) until τ . We will
mainly use the score for 2000 CE (τ = 0), but we will also calculate the score for
1500 CE and 1 CE.
The main independent variable Agyearsi measures the time before present since
the Neolithic transition to agriculture in the country-area in question and is taken
from Putterman with Trainor (2006). As discussed above, our key hypothesis is
that α1 > 0, implying that country-areas where agriculture emerged earlier should
have experienced both an earlier state formation and a longer state history. The
magnitude of the estimate informs us about the exact relationship in years between
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the appearance of agriculture and states. Furthermore, when we use State age as
the dependent variable, we expect to find a combination of estimates αˆ1 ∈ (0, 1) and
αˆ0 < 0, implying that agriculture generally precedes states.
The vector Zi includes other historical control variables, for instance a variable
Origtime, capturing the approximate time since the first settlement of a country
territory by anatomically modern human beings. This variable was introduced by
Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) as a determinant of the variation in levels of ethnic
diversity across the world. Humans first appeared in East Africa about 160,000
years ago and then spread to other continents, reaching places like Scandinavia and
Southern Argentina very late (the mean date for first settlement is 58,917 years ago).
Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) showed that this measure was positively associated with
current ethnic diversity. In the regressions below, we investigate whether this even
deeper historical variable had any impact on the timing of state emergence.
The vector of geographical controls Xi includes variables such as the latitude
of the centroid of the modern-day country i, whether the country is landlocked,
its distance to coast or ocean-navigable river, average elevation, the land suitabil-
ity for agriculture, climatic variables for temperature and precipitation, and the
risk of malaria.18 In most of the regressions, we also include continent dummies.
These variables, as well as other variables employed in the empirical analysis, are
summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1
We present the estimation results for equation (4) in Table 2 for both State
age and Statehist. The main estimate of interest is that associated with timing of
agricultural transition α1, and is the first coefficient in all specifications. In column
(1), we present the unconditional estimate of the impact of timing of Neolithic
transition on State age. The coefficient is 0.471, implying that a 1000-year earlier
transition to agriculture is predicted to have been associated with a 471 years earlier
first state formation.19
18These variables are taken from the Portland Physical Geograhy dataset and from the dataset
compiled from various other sources by Ashraf and Galor (2013). We detail on the variable defini-
tions in the appendix.
19Petersen and Skaaning (2010) provide the only other econometric estimate of which we are
aware regarding the impact of timing of agricultural transition on emergence of states in a cross-
section of countries, reporting a coefficient value of 0.406. Apart from this partially overlapping
regression exercise, with its encouragingly similar coefficient, the scope of their paper is different in
that we develop and analyze a full historical series for state presence in the BCE era, whereas they
identify only the single data point, year of state emergence, their aim being to trace the impact
of biogeographic conditions on state emergence through the channel of adoption and diffusion of
agriculture. Their analysis thus lacks counterparts to our exercises on the impact of agricultural
transition on statehist and to those distinguishing internally from externally originated states, as
well as to all remaining parts of our paper. To conserve space, we detail differences in data and
specification of the regression in question in our Appendix A6.
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Inclusion of the control variables in column (2) and the continent dummies in
(3) lead to a slightly lower estimate of α1. In all specifications the coefficient re-
mains strongly significant. All in all, these estimates confirm the catalytic impact
of transition to agriculture on the emergence of states.
Table 2
The unconditional relationship is shown in Figure 3 where observations are distin-
guished by continent. We also show the line consistent with State Age = Agyears.20
In a few African countries (like Sudan and Botswana), agriculture and states were
introduced at the same time from outside. In all other countries, states evolved
later. For countries close to the mean level of Agyears (4,717), the transition to
agriculture is predicted to precede state emergence by approximately 3,050 years.21
Figure 3
In columns (4)-(6), we use the cumulative Statehist index for 2000 CE (Si0) as
the dependent variable. α1 is significant also here but displays a lower magnitude.
The main finding is that the timing of the Neolithic transition does not only affect
the onset of state history, it also has a positive effect on state persistence throughout
history. This result is robust to the inclusion of squared geographical controls (see
Table D1 in the online appendix).
The control variables also reveal some interesting patterns. The coefficient for
Origtime is never significant, suggesting that settlement events far back in prehistory
did not have any direct impact on state formation. Latitude (of modern-country
centroid) does not seem to influence state experience either. Elevation, however,
has a positive impact. A plausible reason for this observed relationship seems to be
the natural protection that a varied landscape (particularly with mountains) could
provide, which would favor the better and/or earlier consolidation of large-scale
politically-organized societies.
Among the other geographical variables, temperature has a positive and signifi-
cant impact whereas the estimate for precipitation is negative, suggesting that hot
and dry places (like Egypt and Iraq) were favorable for state emergence and per-
sistence. An increase in temperature by one degree Celsius would, ceteris paribus,
imply a 72-93 years earlier emergence of states according to the estimates in columns
(2)-(3). Furthermore, being located on a landlocked territory or in a malaria-prone
area also strongly delay state formation. Modern-day landlocked territories experi-
enced the dawn of their first state almost 500 years later than non-landlocked ones.
20The line is also equivalent to regression parameters being α0 = 0 and α1 = 1.
21Figure C2 in the appendix displays the unconditional relationship between Statehist and the
timing since the Neolithic transition.
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Apart from their likely influence on the timing of the Neolithic transition, the vari-
ables capturing land suitability for agriculture and percent of arable land have no
direct impact on state history or emergence.
As noted in section 2.1, the process of state formation is expected to differ
between internally- and externally- originated states.22 In Table 3, we subdivide
the sample into 78 internally originated and 71 externally originated states with
the purpose of understanding whether or not the agricultural transition timing and
other factors influence domestic and foreign state formation heterogeneously.
Table 3
The estimate for Agyears is quite different between the two types of countries
in Table 3; the coefficients imply that 1000 years earlier transition to agriculture is
associated with 530 years earlier state emergence in internally-originated states, as
opposed to just 300 years in externally-originated ones. The correlation is weaker
in the latter states, likely due to other factors, such as geography or unobserved
characteristics of their territories, driving both the conquest/colonization of their
territories, as well as the introduction to agriculture. In internally-originated states
the variable transition to agriculture is arguably more exogenous than in the case of
externally-originated states. This is supported by the fact that in all cases of locally-
based state emergence, agriculture preceded the emergence of large-scale political
organization, whereas for some of the 71 externally-originated states, agriculture
and the state arrived together. Moreover, for roughly half of the cases of locally-
based state emergence, we documented a gradual transition from no to large-scale
political organization. This indicates that, in certain territories, states gradually
emerge long after the adoption of agriculture, as an intensification of economic and
political activities, while in others agriculture might be introduced along with state
institutions.23
A simple t-test of equality of coefficients in columns (1)-(2) reveals that the
estimates are significantly different. The difference between the two estimates is
22We use the initial z2it score to draw the distinction between the two. Specifically, we take
the state to be internally-originated if the initial z2it = 1, and externally-originated if the initial
z2it < 1. Another interesting distinction would be that between pristine states (with an entirely
original development) and states created by local actors but in regions in which knowledge of the
state concept had diffused by outside example (Mayan rulers could not know of the precedents of
Mesopotamia, for example, but Hittite ones almost certainly did). Although we did not attempt to
identify which cases could be considered strictly pristine in this sense, we suspect that their number
would be too small to support statistical analysis.
23For externally-originates states, the endogeneity problem could occur due to the selection into
the sample of colonially-based states, which may depend on their level of exposure to agriculture.
One could expect the association with agriculture to overestimate the true impact of agriculture
on state emergence in this sample (for instance due to geographical proximity to core agricultural
areas, driving both earlier transition to agriculture and earlier political organization). However, the
results suggest that selection (not controlling for the characteristics of these territories) leads to an
underestimated impact of agriculture.
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slightly reduced when control variables are added in columns (3)-(4). This difference
is mitigated and becomes statistically insignificant when we control for continent
fixed effects in columns (5) and (6).
4.2 State history and economic development
It is a well established empirical fact that history, recent and distant, has shaped
the economic development of nations in ways that, to this day, still reverberate
in their economies. Whether initial biogeographic endowment and transition to
agriculture (e.g. Hibbs and Olsson, 2004; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005, Galor and Moav,
2007) or past technology adoption (Comin et al. 2006, 2009), early and productive
starts have been typically shown to translate into better income and institutions in
present times. The experience with state institutions has been put forth as one of
the important correlates of the current wealth distribution in the world. Specifically,
from its original development, the State Antiquity index has been shown to be
positively associated with 1995 income and with the 1960-1995 GDP growth rate
(Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman, 2002). The index of state history (along with
the time from the transition to agriculture) was also shown to predict income levels
today even better when adjusted by the post-1500 population flows, which accounts
for the colonial era migrations (Putterman and Weil, 2010).
In short, previous work has largely agreed upon the fact that a linear positive as-
sociation between long-run state history and current development exists. However,
as scholars have acknowledged, the present shares complex links with the past. For
instance, pre-1500 economic advantages seem to have become relative disadvantages
among colonized countries during the colonial era (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robin-
son, 2001, 2002), although the effect seems attributable to large-scale migration (for
instance, of Europeans to North America, Chile and Australia; see Chanda, Cook
and Putterman, 2014). As of late, this idea of reversal has been revisited, pointing
to a negative association between the time from Neolithic transition and current
income levels in the Western agricultural core - Europe, North Africa and South-
western Asia (Olsson and Paik, 2013). Moreover, the long-run persistence literature
has begun to reveal nonlinearities in how events in the very distant past affect eco-
nomic development. For instance, the migration out of Africa is argued to have
generated a wide array of genetic diversity levels in human populations around the
world. In turn, predicted genetic diversity displays an inverted-u shape relation-
ship with indicators of economic development, including per capita income in 2000
(Ashraf and Galor, 2013).
With these developments in mind and with the new data on the extended state
history index, we revisit the relationship between the degree of exposure to state
institutions and current output. The questions we seek to answer are: 1) Is there a
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relationship between state history, as measured from state emergence to the present,
and current income per capita?; 2) Could a quadratic function describe the relation-
ship between state history and GDP per capita in 2000 better than a linear function?
The first question is motivated by the fact that in previous analysis the Statehist
data was limited to the period 1 - 1950 CE. This effectively forced very old states
such as Iraq or China to take similar values with intermediate states, such as England
(the U.K.). The new data allows us to correct these shortcomings. Therefore, in the
spirit of previous works, we have regressed log per capita GDP in 2000 against the
extended index, and found that the coefficient is positive, significant, and slightly
larger than if we used the 1 - 1950 CE index instead (see results below).
The second question is justified by the empirical observation that old states like
Iraq, Turkey and China are poorer today than younger states like Britain, Denmark
and Japan. The natural next step is to allow per capita output to vary non-linearly
with state history.
Figure 4 illustrates the essence of our findings. On the Y-axis we have the
logarithm of GDP per capita in 2000 and on the X-axis we have the extended
Statehist (normalized with respect to 3500 B.C.E - 2000 CE and computed using
a 1 percent discount rate per period). The figure displays a scatter plot of all
countries in the sample, while also allowing for a quadratic fit of the relationship
between output and Statehist. A hump-shaped relationship emerges when using the
extended Statehist. The immediate implication is that states with extreme values of
Statehist fare worse in terms of per capita GDP in 2000 than states with intermediate
levels of Statehist, as measured by the extended index. However, this relationship
is not observed when using the restricted Statehist 1-1950 CE, which only shows
a relative disadvantage of very young states compared to all other states (see the
strictly monotonic increase in log per capita GDP in 2000 when Statehist increases
in figure C3 in the online appendix).
Figure 4
The figure above displays the unconditional relationship between income and
Statehist.24 The question arises whether or not this is a direct relationship or if
it merely reflects other historical forces at play or natural conditions which may
have shaped both the history of state institutions and current wealth. In order to
investigate this issue, we set up the following model:
Log(GDPpc2000 )i = β0+β1 ·Statehisti+β2 ·Statehist2i +β′j ·Zi+β′k ·Xi+λc+i (5)
24This quadratic relationship is evident also when we divide the sample into internally- and
externally- originated states and when we use the ancestry- adjusted Statehist index. See Figures
C4-C6 in the appendix.
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On the left hand-side of equation (5) we have per capita GDP in 2000 in log-
arithmic form. On the right-hand side we include our main independent variable,
Statehist, both linear and squared, to account for the quadratic relationship. Zi is a
vector of historical controls including: Agyearsi, the time since Neolithic transition
on the territory of country i, and Origtimei - the time since first human settlement
on the territory of modern-day country i. In a more flexible specification, we include
the square of Origtimei and a linear control State agei. Xi is a vector containing all
the geographic controls included in equation (5) above. λc is a vector of continent
fixed effects. The results using the Statehist index are displayed in Table 4. In panel
A, we use the new Statehist index, while in panel B, the Statehist 1 -1950 CE data.
Columns (1)-(4) in Table 4 present the results without controlling for geographic
characteristics. In columns (6)-(7) we present the results within continents.
Table 4
Our main coefficients of interest are β1 and β2, which estimate the relationship
between current per capita income and state experience. In column (1) we display
the simple association between per capita income and Statehist, which is positive
and similar in magnitude across the two panels, but slightly less precisely estimated
when the independent variable is (the new, extended) Statehist. In column (2) we
add the squared Statehist, and the results mirror the pattern conveyed by Figure 4:
In panel A, both coefficients are significant at 1 percent, β1 is positive, while β2 is
negative, which confirms the concave relationship between log per capita GDP and
state history. By contrast, in panel B, the counterpart of this specification using
Statehist 1 -1950 CE displays coefficients with the same signs but much smaller and
insignificant (the coefficient of the quadratic term is close to zero).25
We move directly to column (4) in panel A, where we introduce the first historical
control - Agyears (shown to be positively significantly correlated with the dependent
variable in column 3, for comparison purposes). Its inclusion hardly changes the signs
and the magnitude of the coefficients of the Statehist terms. Moreover, the effect of
the time from transition to agriculture is insignificant. When we include Origtime
in column (5), the magnitude of the estimates changes, but the relationship remains
concave. In columns (6) and (7), where we control for continent fixed effects, we
learn that the quadratic relationship holds within continents as well.
The last column accounts for the age of states and also for recent developments in
the literature postulating that the patterns of human settlement in prehistory may
have complex effects on later economic development (Ashraf and Galor, 2013). By
25Note that we obtain similar estimates if we use the 1-2000 CE Statehist index instead, meaning
that the 1950-2000 CE-period is not what is driving the quadratic relationship documented in panel
A.
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introducing the squared Origtime variable, we control for a nonlinear relationship
in the time since first human settlement.26 However, the coefficients of the terms
containing Origtime are insignificant, while the State Age control has a negative and
significant, albeit small effect. The introduction of state age diminishes the estimate
on Statehist squared, indicating that the right extreme of Figure 4 is explained by
the length of state existence (the extensive margin of state history), in addition to
the overall degree of autonomy or territory considerations (the intensive margin).
We note that in panel B, the main estimates when using the old Statehist are neither
significant, nor similar in terms of signs with the estimates in panel A. This speaks
to the added value of the extended Statehist data.
Lastly, from Table 4, based on the estimates of our coefficients of interest, we can
infer that the optimal predicted level of Statehist is reached at 0.356, which is very
close to that of the United Kingdom (0.357), and most countries in Western Europe.
The effects’ magnitudes are not straightforward to assess from the tables. However,
some numerical examples may show more clearly how the impact of an increase in
Statehist depends on the original level of state experience. Take for instance the
case of Indonesia, which has 1350 years of state existence and a Statehist score of
0.254. If we could hypothetically increase the Statehist score by 0.1 (reaching the
level of the UK score), the implied approximate effect on per capita GDP in 2000
would be roughly a 20 percent increase, from USD 773 to USD 944 in 2000.27 The
opposite would happen if we were to increase the value of the Statehist score by 0.1
for China, which starts off with a value of 0.582: the approximate effect would be a
drop in per capita GDP in 2000 by 44.4 percent.
The findings so far are based on the raw Statehist data. This means that we only
account for the history within the territories of modern-day countries. However,
this ignores the state history of other territories from which people migrated in
the past to settle in new territories. Population flows after 1500, when the era of
colonization began, are instrumental in mapping the impact of historical events to
today’s economic performance. This is because the ancestors of today’s population
have evidently brought with them the history, the know-how and the experience with
state institutions from their places of origin (Putterman and Weil, 2010; Comin et
al, 2010; Ashraf and Galor, 2013).
We therefore use an alternative measure of state history which is obtained by
adjusting the Statehist index with the migration matrix developed by Putterman and
26We explore alternative specifications in Table D2 in the appendix, where we include linear and
squared variables such as the timing from transition to agriculture, state age, absolute latitude,
migratory distance from Addis Ababa, and predicted genetic diversity (where the latter two are
taken from Ashraf and Galor, 2013). Our main coefficients of interest are robust.
27The exact calculation based on estimates in column 2 of panel A is [(7.010−2 ·9.842 ·0.254)/10] ·
100% = 20.1%
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Weil (2010). We then re-estimate equation (5) using this new measure - the ancestry-
adjusted Statehist - which, for each country, represents the average Statehist of its
year 2000 population’s ancestors, with the weights for each source country being the
share of then-living ancestors estimated to have lived on its present-day territory.
The results, using two alternative adjustment methods, are displayed in Table 5.
In panel A, we use the Statehist index in 1500, which we adjust by the migration
matrix (as in previous work, but for the first time including full state history before
1 CE). In panel B, we use a composite index obtained by adding the raw 1500 - 2000
Statehist to the ancestry - adjusted Statehist index at 1500, which is then normalized
by the full discounted score for 3500 BCE - 2000 CE. The 1500 - 2000 CE part is
added in order to account for the places’ histories in the past five centuries.28
Table 5
We find that the inverted-u shape relationship between per capita income and the
ancestry-adjusted Statehist is robust to all specifications and that the coefficients
of interest are significant at 1 percent level in all columns in panel A. Moreover,
the explanatory power of the model when we introduce only the ancestry-adjusted
Statehist terms (column 2) is now 20.9 percent vs 5.2 for unadjusted Statehist. The
results using the measure used in panel B, look reassuringly similar to those in
Table 4, panel A. The interpretation of these results is similar, but more nuanced
than that where we use the raw data: territories which accumulated limited or
extensive state experience, either locally or through an inflow of knowledge from
migrant populations, have a lower per capita GDP in 2000 CE than those with an
intermediate level of state experience.
How should this inverted-u shape relationship be understood? Although an ex-
tensive analysis of the causal mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper, we can
at least offer some reflections. First, our finding appears to be consistent with the
fact that while there is indeed a great deal of persistence of early societal advan-
tages, it is also the case that the technological and institutional know-how of societies
can slowly diffuse to neighboring societies through migration or trade. These soci-
eties with younger states can then pick the best practices of the older societies and
potentially avoid some of the pitfalls that might have become a drag for the old
civilizations. Hence, while the capacity to organize states is a major asset in early
stages of development, it is not necessarily the case that the oldest civilizations have
the most efficient economies.
28Conceptually, the first part of the component index represents the history non-indigenous pop-
ulations brought with them to their new homes in 1500 (or after), the second part the political
experience they (and indigenous descendants, if any) experienced there since that time. Such a
composite gives only a rough accounting for actual experience insofar as many migrants arrived
long after 1500, and the timing of migration differs considerably both by receiving and by source
country.
22
Our finding that economic development in countries with old civilizations typi-
cally lag behind the countries with an intermediate length of state history like the
United Kingdom and the Scandinvian countries, has been discussed in recent work
by Olsson and Paik (2013).29 According to the authors, the main reasons for this
“Western reversal of fortune“ since the onset of agriculture were institutional: the
old civilizations developed autocratic, hierarchical societies that were not conducive
to the emergence of democracy and innovation, which became critical factors for
economic growth during the modern era.30 The more peripheral regions, which
were slower to develop state institutions, were furthermore less exposed to raids by
roaming armies and to incursions by migrating peoples.
Other factors that have been proposed for explaining the reversal in the Western
core include environmental degradation in the Fertile Crescent and in parts of the
Mediterranean region. Once agriculture spread out of the Fertile Crescent, the more
robust loess soils of northern Europe, combined with a reliance on rain rather than
irrigation for cultivation, proved to be an advantage in the long run (Jones, 1981). It
has also been suggested that the rise and fall of dominant empires of the Western core
followed cycles of expansion, over-extension, and eventually decline, with a gradual
shift of power towards the northwest (Kennedy, 1989). Acemoglu et al (2005) show
that the emergence of Atlantic trade after 1500 CE had a major impact on the rise
of for instance Spain and the United Kindgom.31
A similar process can potentially explain comparative development in East Asia.
Japan’s less powerful central court and greater perceived vulnerability to potential
Western colonizers led it to undertake decisive modernization measures almost a
century before China. This development had spillover effects to Korea and Taiwan,
all young states in comparison with China.
We leave it for future work to attempt to identify the exact causal mechanism
behind the emergence of the inverted-u shaped relationship between state history
and economic development.
29Olsson and Paik (2013) present preliminary evidence showing that similar reversals appear to
have been in place also in East Asia and in Sub-Saharan Africa.
30Wittfogel’s (1957) ”hydraulic hypothesis” makes the related argument that the old riverine
civilizations were autocratic due to the technological nature of large-scale irrigation. See also Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2012) for an analysis of how countries with inclusive, democratic institutions
eventually tend to dominate countries with extractive, autocratic institutions.
31Acemoglu et al (2001) argue that there was also a reversal among former colonies such that
relatively less advanced pre-colonial societies had an inflow of European migrants who installed
strong institutions that still persist today. Hariri (2012) argues that non-European countries with
older states that resisted European colonization had worse economic outcomes in the modern era
due to the persistently autocratic nature of their states.
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4.3 State history, population growth and technological progress
Having established that state history is related to current per capita income in a
non-monotonic fashion, we also inquire whether there is a persistence of this pattern
when it comes to historical economic development. Did state experience, measured
through the index extended to the BCE period, make a difference for the distribution
of wealth in the world in 1500 CE (or 1 CE)?
In order to answer these questions, we estimate equation (5), using various indi-
cators of economic development in 1500 CE as the dependent variable: population
density, urbanization and technology adoption (for a detailed description of the
variables used see the appendix). In Table 6 we display the results from the model
explaining population density in 1500 CE (panel A) and urbanization rate in 1500
CE (panel B). All specifications are analogous to those in tables in section 4.2.32
Table 6
In the first column in both panels we see that extended Statehist is positively
and significantly correlated with past population density. Interestingly, in the second
column, where we introduce Statehist squared, both coefficients are highly signifi-
cant, displaying the same quadratic relationship with the left-hand side variable as
uncovered in section 4.2. Unconditional on other characteristics of the territories
of the modern-day countries in the sample, the positive impact of an increase in
state experience on population density diminishes up to a point where it becomes
null. Beyond this point, increased experience with state institutions impacts nega-
tively on population density. For historical urbanization rates, we observe the same
quadratic pattern displayed by the coefficients of Statehist and Statehist squared,
which are significant at conventional levels for outcomes in 1500 CE. The non-linear
pattern is robust to all changes in specification and it holds even within continents.
The estimated state history effects are net of the contribution of early transition
to agriculture, which was still influencing positively the population density at 1500
CE (note that the link between Neolithic transition and current per capita GDP
disappears when the two state history terms were introduced in Tables 4 and 5).
This indicates that the same dynamics leading towards or away from an optimal
intermediate level of state history were at work even before the colonial era.
Remarkably, the same concave relationship emerges when the dependent variable
is the average index of technology adoption (constructed by Comin et al., 2010), par-
ticularly in 1500 and 2000 CE (panels A and B in Table 7). Furthermore, using the
ancestry-adjusted Statehist to explain the differences in average technology adoption
32We also fitted multiple regression models where the economic outcomes depend linearly on
Statehist. The results displayed in Tables D7-D10 in the appendix reveal that these models have
slightly lower explanatory power than the models allowing for quadratic Statehist effects.
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in 2000 yields significant estimates both across and within continents (see online ap-
pendix Table D4, panel B). This result is perfectly consistent with the explorations
of current income in relation to Statehist.33We note that the inverted-u relationship
is also observed for all outcomes in year 1 CE, but it becomes insignificant when
we gradually introduce controls in the regressions (see online appendix Table D3 -
panels A and B, and Table D4, panel A ).
Table 7
Note that our main estimates of interest remain very similar when we control
for State age (in column 7 of all tables). This indicates that the intensive margin of
the index, given by the autonomy, coherence and territorial extent of the centralized
rule, is the main driver of the results. We conclude that places with a long, solid
and unchallenged experience of state institutions incurred economic disadvantages
relative to ones with intermediary Statehist scores. Equally, places at the opposite
extreme, with little, often interrupted, or territorially very limited state experience,
are also worse-off than those in the middle of the Statehist range. Moreover, our
evidence suggests that these comparative disadvantages may have already aﬄicted
the territories corresponding to today’s countries two thousand years ago. They
appear to have already shaped their economic trajectories by 1500, setting the stage
for the marked wealth disparities in the world today.
The new pattern uncovered by the extended Statehist shows that, beyond a cer-
tain point, a longer enduring state history is associated with economic disadvantages.
However, caution is recommended against the interpretation of these disadvantages
as embedded in long histories, and hence insurmountable. Our view is not that
a long uninterrupted state history is “bad“ for economic developent per se and as
such undesirable. We believe this is a story of adaptability of the state institutions
to the ever-changing economic realities, a trait which Statehist is merely a proxy
for. Moreover, apart from adjusting our state history scores downwards when the
territory of what is now a country was incorporated into an externally-based empire,
we have not explored systematically what impact (if any) the interactions between
states has had. Technology diffusion, for instance, is a manifestation of such com-
plex interactions creating positive externalities (Comin and Hobijn, 2010), where
the risk associated with the initial development of a new technology is reduced for
states that adopt the already tested technology from earlier experimenters.
Although the analysis of this section has demonstrated a clear association be-
tween a history of state presence and the overall level of technological development,
33As a robustness check, we have redone the estimations using the overall technology adoption
index excluding the agriculture components; the results are very similar. See Table D6 in the
appendix.
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we have thus far presented no evidence that states contributed directly to any spe-
cific area of technical progress. Speculation about the roles of states in fostering
specific technological developments is common, however. In our final empirical ex-
ercise, we explore the statistical relationship of states to a fundamental technology
often surmised to be related to their emergence: writing. It proved possible to as-
semble estimates of the year in which writing first emerged in 148 of our sample
countries, and we make use of this data for the exercises shown in Table 8.34
Table 8
Before turning to the regressions, some descriptive comments are of interest. Al-
though development of writing is associated in the conventional wisdom with the
record-keeping needs of early states, it would be oversimplifying, we think, to sup-
pose that state emergence was the only or crucial impetus for writing. Of the 143
countries in our sample, emergence of writing follows that of a state in 80 cases,
leaving 63 cases in which writing preceded the state. Many of the latter may re-
flect instances in which writing happened to diffuse to a given peripheral location
somewhat faster than state organization, with both originating in a common core
area. So the order of appearance for cases in which both the state and writing
emerged with little external influence is of special interest. Of the six most likely
cases of this kind—Mesopotamia (Iraq), Egypt, China, the Indus Valley (India or
Pakistan), Mesoamerica (Mexico) and the Andes (Peru)—our data show state for-
mation preceding writing’s emergence in four cases, the exceptions being Egypt and
Mexico.35 In the four cases in which the state came first, writing appeared at least
a half millennium and on average of 1.21 millennia after the state, while in both
cases in which writing emerged first, the timing difference is only 0.2 millennia. The
pattern of shorter time lag when writing precedes the state also holds for the full
sample, although with less pronounced asymmetry: a state precedes writing by an
unweighted average of 517 years in the 80 countries in which the state appears first,
whereas writing precedes the state by an average of 397 years in the 63 countries
having the reverse order.
There are also differences when we divide the sample into internally-originated
and externally-originated states. The former are significantly more likely to have
writing appear after the state does (which occurs in 69.4 percent of cases) than are
34Comin et al.’s data include presence of writing in 1000 BCE, 1 CE and 1500 CE, and the main
source on which they rely, Peregrine (2001) provide a few additional observations by millennium.
However, we found an online compilation of estimates for first emergence of writing, checked its
sources, and assembled those that appeared to reflect consensus views. Details can be found in the
appendix.
35Another three cases are also relatively early and possibly but less definitively independent: Iran,
Guatemala, and Bolivia. In all three, states emerged first, then writing.
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the former (which have states before writing in only 42.2 percent of cases).36
In panel A of Table 8 we report the results using the entire sample for which we
have data on extended state history and the emergence of writing. The estimate of
the relationship between state onset and writing is significant at the 1 percent level
and its value, 0.701, implies that states that emerged 1000 years earlier, adopted
writing 701 years earlier. By comparison, one millennium of earlier transition to
agriculture, also quite significantly correlated with writing’s emergence, is associ-
ated with only 387 years of advance in adopting writing (column 2) although both
appearance of agriculture and emergence of a state are significant predictors of writ-
ing when entered jointly in column (3).
Moreover, when geographical controls are added to the model, the relationship
between state onset and the emergence of writing remains significant, while the im-
pact of early transition to agriculture becomes insignificant. This suggests that it
may be something about the presence of a state per se that encouraged the devel-
opment or adoption of writing. Although we do not attempt to disentangle possible
channels here, the explanations may lie in the administrative requirements of the
states, those of closely associated early priesthoods, or simply the greater division
of labor aided by macro-level political order.
Since writing in some states may have been diffused into adjacent territories not
yet politically organized, these results may also reflect a catalytic effect of writing
for the emergence of centralized of power. Therefore, in panel B, we also present
the result from the subsample of states where the emergence of political institu-
tions preceded the emergence of writing. All results are robust to the inclusion of
geographical controls and continent indicators, reinforcing the idea that political
institutions played a part in the invention and adoption of writing. This is con-
sistent with the general view that writing was a means of facilitating taxation and
record-keeping, features that are central to the state apparatus.
5 Conclusions
We coded and assembled a comprehensive index of state history from state emer-
gence (which often occurred before the Common Era) to 2000 CE for a sample of
159 countries, building on the previously constructed State antiquity index of Bock-
stette et al (2002). Grounding our definition of state in the anthropological and
political literatures, we outlined the guiding principles followed in mapping histori-
cal information into the three components that make up the state history index: 1)
Existence of a state, 2) whether the state is home-based or imposed from without;
36A t-test finds the difference between the two types of state in probability that states precede
writing to be significant at the 0.1% level.
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and 3) territorial coverage of the state relative to the boundaries of the present-day
country. Tracing these characteristics of the states back to the emergence of the
state in the territories defined by modern country borders, we obtained three over-
arching measures of state presence and evolution: 1) a cumulative Statehist index
(as in Bockstette et al.), 2) State age (time since state emergence) and 3) a con-
temporaneous State index capturing the level of state presence at different points
in time. A particular advantage with our data stems from the availability of state
history information at various levels of spatial and temporal aggregation. The in-
herent features of the process of compiling state scores render our data particularly
versatile for a large variety of comparative analyses.
After presenting the comprehensive state history data, we revealed a series of pat-
terns of state evolution, reversal and catching-up. We employed the data to explore
the determinants of state formation. In particular, we demonstrated empirically
the strong catalytic relationship between the Neolithic transition to agriculture and
state emergence, as well as a strong association between the timing of that transition
and cumulative state history.
In our regression analysis, we explored the relationships between state history
and income level, early historical proxies for income (population density and urban-
ization), and technology. Whereas previous estimates using data for the period 1
to 1950 CE only had suggested a linear relationship, we showed that cumulative
state history from earliest emergence to 2000 CE has a concave, rather than lin-
ear relationship with current income and with our demographic proxies for income,
especially in 1500, and we confirmed that inclusion of the BCE period is crucial
to this result. Contrary to what was previously thought about the positive linear
relationship beween the two, we showed that they are related through an inverted-u
function. Countries with scores at the extremes of the Statehist range are worse off
in terms of both current and historical economic development than countries with
intermediate values of Statehist. The optimal level of state history as defined here
is estimated to be that of modern-day United Kingdom. This points to the role of
adaptable institutions and learning. These features may be lacking in countries with
the longest histories of state presence, but may prevail in the younger yet mature
states, such as those in Western Europe.
Finally, after finding a similar relationship between states and a broad index
of technologies as between states and income, we carried out what may be the
first global-scale investigation of the temporal connection between state formation
and emergence or adoption of writing. While writing was found to precede state
presence in almost half of the 143 countries for which we could compile data, we
found that writing followed state formation in the large majority of cases in which
states emerged from an internal process rather than being imposed from without.
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We also found a more statistically robust and significant relationship of writing with
state emergence than with agricultural transition, supporting the notion of a special
role of states in the adoption and transmission of writing systems.
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FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Emergence of states in the world 3500 BCE-2000 CE
Note: The graph shows the logged value of the aggregate State index for 159 countries identified during 110
50-year intervals between 3500 BCE 2000 CE. The value 100 is equivalent to all 159 countries in our sample
being full states, as defined in the text. On the horizontal axis, negative values imply years BCE whereas
positive values show the CE-period. A linear fitted regression line has been included. The State index is
calculated as described in text.
Figure 2: Emergence of states in four agricultural core areas and in the world as a whole
3500 BCE- 2000 CE
Note: The figure shows the development of the aggregated State index in the Western agricultural zone
(including 62 current countries in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, as well as Afghanistan, Armenia,
Azerbaidjan, Georgia, India, Iran, Kazachstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan), Eastern Asia (20 countries), Americas (including 27 countries in North and South America
and in the Caribbean), and Sub-Saharan Africa (47 countries). Oceania (including 3 countries) is omitted.
It also shows the aggregate index for the 159 countries in the world as a whole (solid black line). On the
horizontal axis, negative values imply years BCE whereas positive values show the CE-period. Particular
years with trend breaks are marked.
Figure 3: Relationship between State age and Time since Neolithic Transition
Note: The figure shows the simple relationship between State age and Agyears including a fitted regression
line and a 45 degree-line where State age = Agyears. Observations are distinguished on the basis of the
continent to which they belong and their 3-letter country isocodes.
Figure 4: Non-linear relationship between Log GDP per capita in 2000 and Statehist index
Note: The figure shows a fitted quadratic regression line corresponding to the estimates in Table 4, Panel
A, column2, with 154 country observations distinguished by 3-letter country isocodes.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A State history indicators N Mean SD Min Max
Statehist 159 0.234 0.172 0.017 0.743
Statehist 1 - 1950 CE 159 0.386 0.261 0.012 0.978
Ancestry - Adjusted Statehist in 2000 CE 154 0.252 0.189 0.017 0.811
Ancestry - Adjusted Statehist in 1500 CE 154 0.218 0.167 0.000 0.747
State Age (millenia) 159 1.639 1.430 0.100 5.500
Internally- originated 159 0.490 0.501 0 1
Panel B Outcome Variables
Time since Writing Emerged (millenia) 149 1.649 1.186 0.100 5.400
(Log) Population Density in 1 CE 135 -0.112 1.530 -4.510 3.170
(Log) Population Density in 1500 CE 154 0.905 1.461 -3.817 3.842
Urbanization Rate in 1 CE 128 2.641 0.624 1.000 3.000
Urbanization Rate in 1500 CE 83 7.278 5.134 0.000 28.000
Average Technology Adoption in 1 CE 128 0.739 0.274 0.000 1.000
Average Technology Adoption in 1500 CE 112 0.487 0.317 0.000 1.000
Average Technology Adoption in 2000 CE 130 0.451 0.198 0.174 1.012
(Log) GDP pc in 2000 154 7.488 1.606 4.463 10.531
Panel C Covariates
Agyears (millenia) 151 4.717 2.442 0.362 10.500
Origtime (millenia) 158 58.917 49.958 0.200 160.000
Absolute centroid latitude 159 26.368 17.704 0.422 67.469
Landlocked 134 0.224 0.418 0.000 1.000
Distance to coast and rivers 149 374.333 457.408 7.952 2385.58
Mean Elevation 149 637.715 551.281 9.167 3185.920
Land Suitability 145 0.378 0.248 0.000 0.960
Percentage Arable Land 156 15.852 14.001 0.040 62.100
Temperature 158 18.226 8.350 -7.929 28.639
Precipitation 158 92.959 61.700 2.911 259.952
Malaria (percentage population at risk) 151 0.316 0.426 0.000 1.000
Note: The table summarizes all variables used in the analysis, as follows: 1) Panel A describes the State
history variables created by us; 2) Panel B outlines some historical and economic variables which are used
as dependent variables in the regression analysis. The time since writing emerged is a novel variable that we
compiled, measured in thousands of years. The data for historical population density is based on population
data from McEvedy and Jones(1978) and land data from World Banks World Development Indicators. The
data for urbanization rate in 1 CE is taken from Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010) and is based on Peregrine
(2003). The data for urbanization rate in 1500 CE is that reported by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2005). The Average Technology Adoption indices in 1 CE, 1500 CE and 2000 CE are constructed by Comin,
Easterly and Gong (2010). Per capita GDP is expressed in current US dollars, as provided by the World Ban;
3) Panel C details on the covariates included in the regressions. Agyears was assembled by Putterman with
Trainor (2006) and it records the number of millennia elapsed in 2000 C.E. since the Neolithic transition
took place. Origtime was coded by Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) and it represents the time since initial
uninterrupted settlement by modern humans (before 2000 CE). The geographic and climatic controls are
retrieved from various sources. The variables’ construction is detailed in Appendix A.
Table 2: Time since the Neolithic transition, state age and state history; overall sample
State Age Statehist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agyears 0.471*** 0.469*** 0.430*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.040***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.047) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Origtime 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Absolute latitude 0.023 0.013 0.004* 0.002
(0.017) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002)
Landlocked -0.486*** -0.464** -0.052** -0.053**
(0.173) (0.183) (0.025) (0.027)
Distance 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
to coast and river (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean Elevation 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Land suitability -0.065 0.193 -0.032 0.018
(0.445) (0.501) (0.059) (0.065)
Percentage -0.009 -0.010 -0.000 -0.001
arable land (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
Temperature 0.093*** 0.072** 0.011*** 0.008*
(0.031) (0.033) (0.004) (0.005)
Precipitation -0.004** -0.005** -0.000 -0.000*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Malaria (percentage -0.480* -0.559* -0.033 -0.063
population at risk) (0.266) (0.299) (0.043) (0.047)
Constant -0.555*** -2.504* -1.528 -0.013 -0.295* -0.131
(0.116) (1.302) (1.480) (0.014) (0.166) (0.190)
Continent FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 151 128 128 151 128 128
R-squared 0.647 0.781 0.791 0.578 0.672 0.697
Note: The dependent variable is State age in columns (1)-(3) and Statehist in columns (4)(6). Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Time since the Neolithic transition and State age in internally vs. externally
originated states
State Age
Internally Externally Internally Externally Internally Externally
originated originated originated originated originated originated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agyears 0.530*** 0.307*** 0.472*** 0.347*** 0.444*** 0.397***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.036) (0.057) (0.061) (0.084)
Origtime -0.000 -0.006* -0.000 -0.011**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Absolute latitude 0.014 0.048* 0.015 0.054
(0.022) (0.025) (0.023) (0.038)
Landlocked -0.438** -1.107*** -0.369 -1.034**
(0.200) (0.380) (0.223) (0.396)
Distance 0.001*** 0.000 0.001* 0.001
to coast and river (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean Elevation 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Land suitability 0.386 -0.331 0.422 -0.265
(0.495) (0.442) (0.588) (0.463)
Percentage -0.013 0.006 -0.012 0.010
arable land (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Temperature 0.102*** 0.128** 0.082** 0.140**
(0.037) (0.048) (0.039) (0.067)
Precipitation -0.002 -0.006** -0.003 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Malaria (percentage -1.259*** 1.009* -1.137** 1.207
population at risk) (0.381) (0.591) (0.497) (0.730)
Constant -0.667*** -0.115 -2.225 -3.375* -1.960 -3.914
(0.153) (0.117) (1.777) (1.931) (1.809) (2.879)
P-value 0.000 0.039 0.600
Continent FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 78 73 71 57 71 57
R-squared 0.761 0.392 0.870 0.709 0.876 0.742
Note: The dependent variable is State age. p-values reported at the bottom of the table represent the
p-values from the test of the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients of agyears within the three pairs of
specifications. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Statehist vs. Statehist 1-1950 CE and (Log) GDP pc 2000. Nonlinear relationship
Panel A Log GDP pc 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist 1.326* 7.010*** 7.337*** 3.869** 4.530** 6.790***
(0.723) (2.291) (2.658) (1.921) (2.057) (2.496)
Statehist squared -9.842*** -9.832*** -4.718 -4.970* -4.657*
(3.529) (3.549) (2.854) (2.793) (2.776)
Agyears 0.105** 0.004 -0.071 -0.087 0.010
(0.048) (0.079) (0.063) (0.079) (0.081)
Origtime 0.002 0.008** 0.010
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013)
Origtime -0.000
squared (0.000)
State Age -0.460**
(0.183)
Observations 154 154 147 147 125 125 125
R-squared 0.020 0.052 0.026 0.064 0.702 0.719 0.734
Panel B Log GDP pc 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist 1.277** 1.940 2.200 0.066 0.251 1.267
1-1950 CE (0.531) (2.049) (2.278) (1.441) (1.597) (1.667)
Statehist 1-1950 -0.783 -0.748 0.942 0.962 0.453
CE squared (2.518) (2.625) (1.608) (1.811) (1.776)
Agyears 0.105** -0.011 -0.069 -0.080 0.012
(0.048) (0.068) (0.055) (0.072) (0.081)
Origtime 0.001 0.007* 0.011
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013)
Origtime -0.000
squared (0.000)
State Age -0.267**
(0.127)
Observations 154 154 147 147 125 125 125
R-squared 0.043 0.044 0.026 0.058 0.704 0.722 0.730
Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Note: The dependent variable is Log per capita GDP in 2000. In panel A the main independent variables
are extended Statehist index linear and squared. In panel B the main independent variables are the Statehist
index 1-1950 CE, linear and squared. The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator of
whether the modern-day country is landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability,
percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Ancestry-Adjusted Statehist and (Log) GDP pc 2000. Nonlinear relationship
Panel A Log GDP pc 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ancestry Adjusted 2.778*** 12.213*** 13.110*** 6.068*** 5.347*** 6.041***
Statehist in 1500 (0.794) (2.263) (2.100) (1.574) (1.647) (1.761)
Ancestry Adjusted -18.218*** -18.636*** -8.984*** -7.519*** -6.794***
Statehist in 1500 squared (4.326) (4.076) (2.176) (2.324) (2.317)
Agyears 0.105** -0.025 -0.056 -0.075 -0.027
(0.048) (0.059) (0.056) (0.078) (0.082)
Origtime 0.003 0.006* 0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013)
Origtime -0.000
squared (0.000)
State Age -0.233
(0.146)
Observations 149 149 147 144 125 125 125
R-squared 0.083 0.209 0.026 0.243 0.722 0.727 0.733
Panel B Log GDP pc 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ancestry Adjusted 1.389** 7.074*** 6.661*** 3.514** 4.123** 6.268***
Statehist in 2000 (0.670) (2.113) (2.426) (1.727) (1.849) (2.286)
Ancestry Adjusted -9.085*** -8.378*** -4.034* -4.250* -4.033*
Statehist in 2000 squared (3.021) (3.000) (2.364) (2.308) (2.289)
Agyears 0.105** 0.021 -0.069 -0.085 0.010
(0.048) (0.080) (0.063) (0.079) (0.081)
Origtime 0.002 0.008** 0.010
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013)
Origtime -0.000
squared (0.000)
State Age -0.463**
(0.186)
Observations 149 149 147 144 125 125 125
R-squared 0.027 0.066 0.026 0.071 0.702 0.719 0.734
Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Note: The dependent variable is Log per capita GDP in 2000. In panel A the main independent variables
are the ancestry-adjusted extended statehist index between 3500 BCE and 1500 CE, linear and squared.
In panel B the main independent variables are the composite ancestry-adjusted Statehist index (where the
discounted ancestry - adjusted scores between 3500 BCE and 1500 CE are added to the raw discounted
scores between 1500 2000 CE, and the final score is normalized by the sum of discounted full scores between
3500 BCE and 2000 CE), linear and squared. The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator of
whether the present-day country is landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability,
percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: State history, Log Population Density and Urbanization in 1500 CE
Panel A Log Population Density in 1500 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist in 1500 3.883*** 9.559*** 6.184*** 7.473*** 6.129*** 11.077***
CE (0.670) (1.666) (2.119) (1.802) (1.709) (3.426)
Statehist in 1500 -12.324*** -9.893*** -7.339** -4.894** -7.326**
CE squared (3.098) (3.498) (3.169) (2.253) (2.905)
Agyears in 1500 0.315*** 0.211*** 0.157** 0.131* 0.217***
CE (0.042) (0.067) (0.065) (0.067) (0.068)
Origtime in 1500 0.005** -0.003 -0.020
CE (0.003) (0.004) (0.014)
Origtime in 1500 0.000
CE squared (0.000)
State Age in 1500 -0.509**
CE (0.214)
Observations 154 154 147 147 128 128 128
R-squared 0.184 0.254 0.269 0.314 0.709 0.767 0.786
Panel B Urbanization in 1500 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist in 1500 16.678*** 29.429*** 35.364*** 48.134*** 41.542*** 69.670***
CE (2.384) (7.323) (8.662) (12.193) (12.707) (22.835)
Statehist in 1500 -25.531** -29.862** -43.924*** -35.621** -49.359***
CE squared (12.514) (12.662) (15.010) (14.076) (17.606)
Agyears in 1500 0.761*** -0.382 -0.206 -0.323 0.152
CE (0.177) (0.244) (0.325) (0.417) (0.481)
Origtime in 1500 -0.076** -0.082* -0.216
CE (0.037) (0.042) (0.146)
Origtime in 1500 0.002
CE squared (0.002)
State Age in 1500 -2.831
CE (1.750)
Observations 83 83 83 83 76 76 76
R-squared 0.278 0.311 0.111 0.324 0.459 0.498 0.532
Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Note: In panel A, the dependent variable is log population density in 1500 CE and the main independent
variables are the extended statehist index between 3500 BCE and 1500 CE, linear and squared. In panel B, the
dependent variable is the urbanization rate in 1500 CE and the main independent variables are the extended
statehist index between 3500 BCE and 1500 CE, linear and squared. The data for historical population
density is based on population data from McEvedy and Jones(1978) and land data from World Banks World
Development Indicators. The data for urbanization rate at 1500 CE is that reported by Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2005), defined as the percentage of a countrys total population residing in urban areas (each
with a city population size of at least 5,000). The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator of
whether the present-day country is landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability,
percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: State history and average technology adoption in 1500 CE and 2000 CE
Panel A Technology Adoption in 1500 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist in 1500 1.227*** 2.841*** 1.695*** 1.727*** 1.068*** 1.782***
CE (0.157) (0.350) (0.444) (0.338) (0.229) (0.416)
Statehist in 1500 -3.359*** -2.587*** -1.855*** -0.743** -0.943***
CE squared (0.738) (0.887) (0.624) (0.346) (0.319)
Agyears in 1500 0.104*** 0.073*** 0.038*** 0.004 0.012
CE (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Origtime in 1500 0.001 -0.001** 0.000
CE (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Origtime in 1500 -0.000
CE squared (0.000)
State Age in 1500 -0.092*
CE (0.049)
Observations 112 112 110 110 107 107 107
R-squared 0.389 0.521 0.532 0.616 0.809 0.902 0.911
Panel B Technology Adoption in 2000 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist 0.086 0.842*** 0.664** 0.302 0.461* 0.604**
(0.095) (0.318) (0.332) (0.239) (0.244) (0.272)
Statehist squared -1.285*** -1.192** -0.405 -0.554* -0.531*
(0.452) (0.459) (0.347) (0.322) (0.319)
Agyears 0.011 0.011 -0.007 -0.004 0.002
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Origtime 0.000 0.001** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Origtime squared 0.000
(0.000)
State Age -0.030
(0.021)
Observations 130 130 129 129 125 125 125
R-squared 0.006 0.044 0.016 0.050 0.643 0.683 0.688
Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Note: In panel A, the dependent variable is the technology adoption index in 1500 CE and the main
independent variables are the extended statehist index between 3500 BCE and 1500 CE, linear and squared.
In panel B, the dependent variable is the technology adoption index in 2000 CE and the main independent
variables are the extended statehist index between 3500 BCE and 2000 CE, linear and squared. The list of
controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator of whether the present-day country is landlocked, distance
to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation,
percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: State age and the emergence of writing
Panel A Time since Writing emerged. All states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State Age in 2000 CE 0.701*** 0.506*** 0.566*** 0.566*** 0.561***
(0.040) (0.091) (0.111) (0.114) (0.116)
Agyears in 2000 CE 0.387*** 0.150*** 0.074 0.076 0.071
(0.022) (0.045) (0.056) (0.062) (0.063)
Origtime in 2000 CE 0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Origtime in 2000 CE -0.000
squared (0.000)
Observations 143 138 138 116 116 116
R-squared 0.729 0.647 0.780 0.816 0.830 0.830
Panel B Time since writing emerged. States that precede writing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State Age in 2000 CE 0.724*** 0.607*** 0.594*** 0.642*** 0.652***
(0.037) (0.113) (0.143) (0.158) (0.160)
Agyears in 2000 CE 0.396*** 0.085 0.056 0.066 0.067
(0.026) (0.062) (0.083) (0.087) (0.087)
Origtime in 2000 CE 0.005** 0.002 0.021
(0.002) (0.004) (0.020)
Origtime in 2000 CE -0.000
squared (0.000)
Observations 80 76 76 64 64 64
R-squared 0.840 0.736 0.870 0.896 0.903 0.905
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE No No No No Yes Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the time since writing emerged, measured in thousands of years. In both
panels the main independent variable is State age, in thousands of years. In panel A we present estimates
from the entire sample, while in Panel B we present estimates from the subsample of countries for which state
emergence preceded the emergence of writing. The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator of
whether the present-day country is landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability,
percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
APPENDIX – For Online Publication 
 
Appendix A. Variables Description and Data Sources 
 
A1. State History Variables: 
 
Statehist. The extended statehist is the normalized aggregate index of state history. This index is 
defined as the sum of all 50-year period state history scores, adjusted by a discount factor, divided by 
the maximum value of a discounted index, corresponding to a state with a score of 50 in every half 
century between 3500 B.C.E. and 2000 C.E.. The index can be calculated using various discount 
rates to put more weight on recent history than on the distant past. Throughout the paper we use the 
1% discount rate.  
 
Statehist 1-1950 CE. This is the statehist computed according to the initial version of the index in 
Bockstette et al. (2002), considering only the period 1 – 1950 C.E. This is also a normalized index 
(with respect to a virtual state that would have full scores for every half century between 1 and 1950 
C.E.). In this paper we use a discount factor of 1% for this index.  
 
Ancestry – Adjusted Statehist in 1500 C.E.  This is the extended statehist index at 1500 C.E., 
adjusted by the migration matrix of Putterman and Weil (2010), as follows: for each country i in the 
sample, we use the matrix to identify the share of the current population that has ancestry that can be 
traced to the territory of country j; for each country j we multiply its statehist score accumulated at 
1500 C.E. (discounted by 1% and normalized with respect to a state with full scores from 3500 
B.C.E. until 1500 C.E.) by a weight which is the share of population in country i identified to have 
roots in country j; the sum of all weighted statehist scores thus obtained across all j  is the ancestry-
adjusted statehist index at 1500 C.E. Using this adjustment, we account for the state experience prior 
to 1500 C.E. of other territories, brought by post-1500 migrants into a certain country, in addition to 
the state history of the country’s own territory.  
 
 Ancestry – Adjusted Statehist in 2000 C.E. This is the extended statehist index at 2000 C.E., 
adjusted by the migration matrix of Putterman and Weil (2010), as follows: we compute the statehist 
index between 1500 and 2000 C.E. (discounted by 1 % and normalized with respect to the same 
period); we add this score to the ancestry – adjusted statehist in 1500 C.E. defined as above.  
 
State Age. This variables, scaled in millennia, represents the total amount of time elapsed from the 
first date (exact or approximate) when state experience is assigned a positive scores (the first date 
when the component S1 pertaining to the existence of a rule above tribal level is positive) until 2000 
C.E. State age does not account for periods of state collapse (scores revert to 0) incurred after the 
original state emergence date. 
  
A2. The emergence of writing  
 
Time since writing emerged. This novel variable, which we scale in millennia throughout the 
analysis in this paper, represents the time elapsed in 2000 C.E. since the date of the first evidence of 
existence of a writing system on the territory of a given modern-day country. Only forms of writing 
beyond proto-writing are considered, the earliest if which are considered to be the cuneiform script in 
Mesopotamia (Iraq, dated around 2900 B.C.E) and the hieroglyphic script of ancient Egypt (which 
new evidence indicates to have been already invented in 3400 B.C.E.)  In order to document the first 
evidence of writing on the territory of each country in the sample, Encyclopaedia Britannica served 
as main source, but various other sources have been consulted. The variable is coded for a total of 
155 countries, 146 of which have the writing information coded with relative certainty. The values of 
the variable for each country along with the corresponding reference are found in the online 
appendix.  
 
A3. Historical controls 
Agyears. This variable assembled by Putterman with Trainor (2006) records for each present-day 
country in a sample of 170 countries the number of millennia elapsed in 2000 C.E. since the 
Neolithic transition of populations that lived on the territory of that country. The year of transition is 
assigned by cross-referencing expert opinions about the time when the population is a particular 
region covered more than half of their calorie intake from agriculture.  
Origtime. This variable coded by Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) represents the time since initial 
uninterrupted human settlement (before 2000 C.E.) on the territories that now belong to modern-day 
countries.  The variable was coded for 191 countries and the coding was based on Oppenheimer 
(2003) and Bradshaw Foundation (2007), as well as Encyclopedia Britannica (2007) for the island 
cases. Since the original settlements follow the paths of the migration routes out of Africa, the 
variable is correlated with the migration distance, and can therefore also be employed as a proxy for 
the latter. 
1
 
The Matrix of Migration since 1500 C.E.. This matrix was developed by Putterman and Weil 
(2010) to describe the composition of the populations of modern-day countries in terms of ancestry 
at 1500 C.E., before the migration flows of the colonial era. The matrix contains 165 rows (each row 
corresponding to a present-day country) and 165 columns (representing the same countries), where 
every cell records the percentage of current population in country on row i that traces its ancestry to 
the population in the source country on column j, such that the sum of all cells on each row is 1. In 
their paper, Putterman and Weil (2010) obtained ancestry-adjusted measures of statehist (1-1950 
C.E.) and agyears, by multiplying each row to each one of the vectors containing the values of their 
variables of interest at 1500 C.E. for each country in their sample (which amounted to a sum over the 
values of the variables of interest of each source country by the corresponding share of the 
population with ancestry in other countries). We follow the same procedure in order to obtain the 
extended ancestry-adjusted statehist.  
 
A4. Outcomes variables 
GDP per capita in 2000. Data in current US dollars, as reported by the World Bank. In a robustness 
check in appendix C, we use the real GDP per capita in constant 2000 international dollars from 
World Penn Table, version 6.2. 
                                                          
1
 In our sample the correlation coefficient between the time since original human settlement and the migration distance of 
Ashraf and Galor (2013) is -0.51, which indicates that the shorter the migration distance to a particular territory, the earlier the 
first human settlement.  
Population density in 1 C.E. and 1500 C.E.. This variable is measured in number of individuals per 
square km. The variable is retrieved from Ashraf and Galor (2013), who employ the population size 
data from McEvedy and Jones (1978), and the land area from World Development Indicators. Since 
the territorial unit employed in McEvedy and Jones (1978) is based on 1975 country borders, in 
some cases, the same value of the population density is assigned to contiguous present-day countries 
(that may have been part of the same constituency in 1975, such as Yugoslavia). 
Urbanization in 1 C.E. This measure of urbanization was computed by Peregrine (2003) in the 
Atlas of Cultural Evolution (ACE). The variable takes three values: 1 if the largest settlement on the 
territory defined by the borders of a given modern-day country was under 100 persons, 2 if the 
largest settlement was between 100 and 399 persons and 3 for settlements larger than 400 persons. 
The variable had been previously used by Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010), from whose dataset we 
retrieved it. 
 Urbanization in 1500 C.E. The urbanization rate for 1500 A.D. comes from Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2005) and it is calculated as the percentage of a country’s urban area population (for 
cities with at least 5,000 inhabitants). 
Technology Adoption in 1 C.E.. These variables are three indices created by Comin, Easterly and 
Gong (2010), henceforth CEG. The index in 1 C.E. is based on data from Peregrine’s (2003) “ACE” 
in which various cultural traits of 289 prehistoric cultures are evaluated: writing, agriculture, 
transportation, urbanization. CEG used this and additional data to code country – level data on 
technology adoption in five sectors: agriculture, transportation, communications, writing, and 
military. The authors structured  the information in “ACE” into indicators that denoted the presence 
or absence of a technology within a certain sector and territory, which they then averaged over to 
create the sector specific technology adoption index between 0 and 1 (e.g. where “ACE” codes 
“technological specialization” by 1 for none, 2 for pottery and 3 for metalworks, CEG  marked 
pottery and metalwork as the two potential technologies within the “industry sector” at the time, 
which they coded using a binary convention 1 – if technology is present and 0 if not;  the average 
over all these dummies within every sector is the value of the technology adoption index for that 
sector; this average for the industry sector in this case would be 0 if neither technology was present, 
0.5 if only one was present and 1 if both were present). Then, the overall adoption level, the variable 
that we use in this paper, for each country was calculated as the average of the adoption levels across 
sectors.  
Technology Adoption in 1500 C.E.. For the average technology adoption measure in 1500 C.E.,  
CEG (2010) used many different sources to summarize information on 20 technologies across 4 
sectors excluding agriculture (for instance, for “Industry”, the two possible technologies are 
“presence of iron” and “presence of steel”). For the latter they used a proxy based not on technology 
presence, but rather on which type of agriculture was the primary source on a particular territory – 
e.g. pastoralism, hand or plough cultivation, or none). As with overall technology adoption in 1 C.E., 
the overall measure in 1500 C.E. is obtained by averaging over the scores for each sector. 
Technology in 2000 C.E. The technology measure in 2000 C.E. is constructed in CEG(2010), based 
on Comin, Hobijn and Rovito(2008) and it captures the gap in the intensity of technology adoption 
for every country with respect to the US (in terms of years of usage of each technology relative to the 
number of years since the invention of that technology) for ten technologies: electricity, internet, 
PC’s, cell phones, telephones, cargo and passenger aviation, trucks, cars and tractors, in per capita 
terms. The average across the technologies’ scores is subtracted from 1 (the level of US, by 
construction) to obtain the country-level technology adoption gap measure. This measure is different 
from the measures for 1 and 1500 C.E., since it also measures adoption along the intensive margin. 
 
A5. Geographical variables 
Absolute latitude. This is the absolute value of the country’s centroid latitude. The variable was 
retrieved from the Portland Physical Geography dataset. 
Distance to coast and river. This variable represents the mean distance to the nearest coastline or 
sea-navigable river, measured in km. The variable was retrieved from the Portland Physical 
Geography dataset. 
Mean elevation. The mean elevation above sea level is measured in meters. The variable was 
retrieved from the Portland Physical Geography dataset. The original source is NOAA’s National 
Geophysical Data Center. 
Land suitability. This is a measure of land suitability for agriculture, computed at country level by 
Michalopoulos (2012), based on grid-cell data reported by Ramankutty et al. (2002). For details on 
the construction of the original index, the reader is referred to Ramankutty et al (2002). The index 
includes information on ecological indicators of climate and soil suitability for agriculture (such as 
drowing degree days, evapotranspiration, soil carbon density and soil pH).  
Percentage arable land. This measures the percentage of a modern-day country’s area that is arable. 
The source is World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Temperature. This a mean across the average monthly temperature over time (1961-1990) in 1-
degree resolution grids within a country. This variable was retrieved from Ashraf and Galor (2013), 
whose source is the G-ECON project (Nordhaus 2006).  
Precipitation. This a mean across the average monthly precipitation over time (1961-1990) in 1-
degree resolution grids within a country. This variable was retrieved from Ashraf and Galor (2013), 
whose source is the G-ECON project (Nordhaus 2006). 
Malaria (percentage population at risk). This variable represents the level of risk of contracting 
malaria (measured by the percentage population in 1994 in areas of high risk of contracting malaria, 
times the share of cases in the country involving fatal species of P. Falciparum). The original data 
was constructed by Gallup and Sachs (2001). 
Landlocked.  This is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is landlocked.  
 
A6.   Remarks on data and regressions of Petersen and Skaaning (2010) 
In Section 4.1 of our paper, especially tables 2-3, we investigate the impact of timing of transition to 
agriculture on timing of emergence of states.  An exercise in Table 3 of Petersen and Skaaning 
(hereafter, P&S) bears similarity to our initial regressions in Table 2, but differences are sufficient to 
merit placing comparative remarks in this appendix.  The first remark concerns the data used.  P&S 
use the same data for year of transition to agriculture as does our paper, and they also take year of 
state emergence from the same source, for states listed by it (Putterman, 2007) as starting in 1 CE or 
later.  However, they independently determine years of state emergence for those countries having a 
state before that year.  Because their data were not published, and because unlike our project they did 
not code state presence, degree to which locally based, or geographic extent and unity on a 
continuous basis for the half centuries of the BCE period, we did not access their data while 
developing ours.  However, we requested their data as our paper was being completed, and found 
that our estimates of early states’ emergence times are 431 years earlier, on average, mainly due to 
our inclusion of paramount chiefdoms and of corresponding archeological evidence of incipient 
states when assessing state emergence (i.e., State age begins for us at the paramount chiefdom or 
corresponding level).  The correlation of estimated year of state emergence in our own and P&S’s 
data is 0.82.  Regarding the estimation of partial correlation coefficient on year of agricultural 
transition in a regression for year of state emergence, the most similar specifications are P&S’s 
model 2 and our Table 2 column 1.  Those two models differ in that P&S always include the 
biological conditions measure from Hibbs and Olsson (2005) in addition to Agyears, which we do 
not do.  In our full series of related regressions, in tables 2 and 3, we also include numerous 
geographic controls absent from the corresponding P&S work, complete with continent fixed effects.  
And we exam separately the impact of Agyears on Stateage among internally versus externally 
originated states, as well as the impact of Agyears on Statehist, which reflects the stock of state 
experience at various points in time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B – Additional Statehist coding information and illustrations 
To code all components of the index in a manner that is consistent across periods, we relied mainly on 
information in the Encyclopedia Britannica Online. We surveyed the main articles on the history of the 
modern-day country (E.g."History of Azerbaijan"), but also articles connected to events in its history (e.g. 
"Azerbaijan -historical region", "Ancient Iran: The Sāsānian period"). There were a number of instances 
where information in Britannica was sparse, in which cases we surveyed alternative sources, such as books 
or journal articles treating individual cases. 
Table B1 illustrates an example of coding based on information from Encyclopedia Britannica, covering the 
period 450 BCE - 1 CE for the territory of modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Table B1. Coding example - the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 400 BCE – 1 CE. 
Year BCE 
Government is above tribe 
level? (   
 ) 
Government 
domestic? 
(   
 ) 
What percentage of the territory 
is ruled?  
(   
 ) 
Weight* 
(    ) 
    
400-201  0.75 1 0.3 1 11.25 
200-151 
(cutoff at 
155) 
0.75 1 0.3 0.9 
12.625 
1 0.5 1 0.1 
150-1 1 0.5 1 0.72 25 
 
CODING INFORMATION 
400 – 200: (0.75, 1, .3). From the 4th century BCE, along with the coming of Celtic tribes in the area, the Illyrian tribes 
became gradually more politically cohesive. Sources recall the existence of early indigenous petty kingdoms in Illyria on 
the territory of present-day Albania only. We therefore mark the occasional Illyrian tribe alliances by    
 =.75.  
200-151: (0.75, 1, .3) until 155 and (1, .5, 1) from 155 onwards. Delminium (on modern-day Bosnian territory) was 
taken by the Romans in 155 BCE, hence    
 =.5. Most of the area of Bosnia was integrated in the Roman province 
Dalmatia, hence    
 ).  The score is [0.9(0.75, 1, .3) + 0.1(1, .5, 1)]*50. 
150-1: (1, .5, 1). Bosnia was under Roman occupation. 
Note:     = number of years between period ends and cutoff, or between two cutoffs, divided by 50. 
 
Figure B1 shows the comparison between the original old Statehist index for the CE-period and the new one 
presented in this paper. A notable feature is that the previous index failed to reflect the state history of 
several ancient civilizations like Egypt and Iran, countries that now receive a substantially higher score. 
Ethiopia, which had a full state by 1 CE but was a relative newcomer compared to those just mentioned, has 
the highest state history value going by the old measure, but now loses in relative terms to the older 
civilizations. 
 
 
Figure B1. Extended Statehist (3500 BCE – 2000 CE) vs Statehist 1-1950 CE 
 
Note: The red, triangular observations with 3-letter isocodes show country observations where states emerged before 
1 CE and whose index score changes considerably with the extended coding. Both variables use a 1 percent discount 
rate.  
 
Due to discounting, the Statehist-index does not provide a strong sense of how long a state has existed on a 
country's territory. A place with thousands of years of early state history can have a relatively low Statehist 
if incorporated into empires during recent centuries, for example. An intuitive non-normalized (and non-
discounted) measure of state history is the simple aggregation of a country's half-century scores 
∑   
   
   
  ̃  
which we can refer to as Full state equivalent years of state history. Table B2 shows the countries with the 
highest and lowest full state-equivalent years. Egypt is by far the country with the longest state history thus 
defined, having accumulated the equivalent of 4116 years as a home-based state with at least 50 percent of 
its current territorial extent. An interpretation could be that since the first state in Egypt emerged 5200 years 
ago, 1084 full state-equivalent years were lost through history due to state collapse, foreign invasions and 
dominance, etc. Also Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan have had very long state histories. The State age (total 
number of years since state emergence until 2000 CE) and Statehist index are also displayed for these 
countries. It should be noted that the ranking of countries by full state-equivalent years is not the same as 
that by State age or Statehist, owing to the variability of the sit-score across time. 
 
Table B2. Full state equivalent years, State age and Statehist: The 10 largest and 10 smallest country levels 
Country Full state equivalent years State age Statehist Statehist 
10 largest  ̃  ( ̃ )  (Non-normalized) (Normalized) 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 4116.34 5200 2495.010 0.742 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 3280.94 5200 2217.940 0.660 
Iraq 3232.94 5500 1988.640 0.591 
Turkey 2962.31 5000 2079.380 0.618 
Pakistan 2922.81 4600 2007.710 0.597 
Yemen 2677 4000 1835.450 0.546 
Syrian Arab Republic 2617.88 4600 1713.200 0.509 
Lebanon 2607.56 4850 1669.840 0.497 
Sudan 2603.69 5000 1832.890 0.545 
China 2566.2 3900 1955.590 0.582 
     
10 smallest  ̃  
  
  
New Zealand 113.25 150 112.379 0.033 
Zimbabwe 110 150 108.767 0.032 
Gabon 95 150 94.259 0.028 
Sierra Leone 87.18 213 86.399 0.025 
Fiji 78 126 77.496 0.023 
Comoros 73 114 72.614 0.021 
Central African Republic 70 100 69.752 0.020 
Kenya 68.5 100 68.252 0.020 
Namibia 63 116 62.594 0.018 
Papua New Guinea 56.25 100 56.064 0.016 
Notes: As discussed in the text, Full state equivalent years ( ̃ ) is simply the undiscounted sum of all half-century 
scores sit from the first state emergence until 2000 CE. State age shows the time since the appearance of the first state 
(including paramount chiefdom) on the country’s territory. We also report the non-normalized and normalized 
Statehist (   , the index calculated for 2000 CE, discounted 1%). Note that the ordering by Full state equivalent years 
is not perfectly consistent with the ordering by State age or Statehist.  
 
At the other end of the scale, we find Papua New Guinea with the shortest full state equivalent history of all 
- only 56 years. Among the ten countries with the shortest state history, seven are African. In general, the 
distribution of  ̃  is strongly skewed to the left, as shown in the histogram in Figure B2. The mean is 984 
years, whereas the median is 639. Some of the countries in the middle of the distribution like UK (1415 
years) and Germany (1420 years) are today among the world's richest countries. 
These aggregated measures of state history hide many interesting patterns for individual countries. For 
instance, several countries with a long state history have experienced repeated periods of fundamental 
regime changes and state failures. 
Figure B3 shows the State index of only two individual countries - Iraq and Sweden - representing one of the 
oldest and one of the youngest state formations in the Western core area. Their Full state equivalent years of 
state history are 3233 and 781 years respectively 
 
Figure B2. Distribution of full state-equivalent years of state history 
 
Note: The graph shows the distribution of our measure of Full state equivalent years of state history ( ̃ ). See the text 
for variable definition. The frequency of countries is shown on the vertical axis. Selected countries are identified in the 
graph.  
 
The first known state in the world according to our index arose in Uruk in current Iraq around 3500 BCE 
and then developed into a full-blown civilization that heavily influenced large parts of historical 
Mesopotamia and neighboring regions for several centuries. Prominent cities such as Ur, Kish, Nippur, and 
Lagash inherited the early civilization of Uruk and developed it even further. 
A period of stagnation then set in from 2300 BCE with repeated state failures in 1750 and 1200 BCE. A 
gradual recovery of state strength then took place up until the heyday of the Assyrian empire, whereupon the 
area started to be dominated by Persians from Iran from about 550 BCE. The Persian conquest is the most 
long-lasting crisis in Iraq's state history, according to the index used. Baghdad then revived as a culturally 
and economically important center around 1000 CE, but this period came to an abrupt end with the Mongols' 
sacking of Baghdad in 1258. 
Sweden's history is very different. A state above tribal level did not arise here until 1150 CE - more than 
four millennia after Uruk's start - but immediately emerged as a full-blown state in terms of our index. The 
only setback (a period of Danish domination) did not last long. Since 1527 CE, Sweden has had a maximum 
score on the State index. 
 
 
 
Figure B3. State history in Iraq and Sweden, 3500 BCE – 2000 CE 
 
Note: The lines show the development of the State index-score in Iraq and Sweden. The State index scores for each 
period are simply equal to 2sit so that a score of 100 percent implies a sit=50. Particularly important historical episodes 
are marked.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C – Supplementary Figures 
Figure C1. Emergence of states in six world regions during the colonial era, 1450-2000 CE 
 
Note: The figure shows the development of the aggregated State index in Europe, Eastern Asia, West and Central Asia 
(including Turkey and India and the located countries in between), Latin America & the Caribbean (all countries in the 
Americas except Canada and USA), Africa (including North Africa), and the Western offshoots (USA, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand). Oceania is omitted. On the horizontal axis, negative values imply years BCE whereas 
positive values show the CE-period. Particular years with trend breaks are marked. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure C2.  Transition to agriculture and state history 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C3. Non-linear relationship between Log GDP per capita in 2000 and Statehist 1 – 1950 CE 
 
Note: The figure shows a fitted quadratic regression line corresponding to the estimates in Table 4, Panel B, column 2, 
with 154 country observations distinguished by 3-letter country isocodes. 
Figure C4.  GDP pc in 2000 C.E. and state history in internally-originated states
 
Figure C5.  GDP pc in 2000 C.E. and state history in externally-originated states 
 
Figure C6.  GDP pc in 2000 C.E. and ancestry- adjusted state history  
 
 
 Appendix D – Supplementary Tables 
 
Table D1. Robustness checks – The Neolithic transition, state onset and state history. 
          
 State Age  Statehist 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Agyears 0.468*** 0.465*** 0.468*** 0.469***  0.050*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Origtime 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Absolute centroid  0.025 0.043* 0.024 0.023  0.004* 0.006* 0.005** 0.004* 
     latitude (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.017)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Landlocked -0.535*** -0.498*** -0.485*** -0.484***  -0.057** -0.053** -0.051** -0.049* 
 (0.178) (0.176) (0.173) (0.173)  (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) 
Distance to coast  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
    and rivers (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mean Elevation  0.000* 0.001* 0.001***   0.000* 0.000** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Land suitability -0.022 -0.276 -0.073 -0.061  -0.027 -0.054 -0.037 -0.028 
 (0.446) (0.482) (0.447) (0.433)  (0.059) (0.062) (0.059) (0.058) 
Percentage  -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009  -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
      arable land (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Temperature 0.094*** 0.062 0.093*** 0.091*  0.011*** 0.008 0.012*** 0.009 
 (0.031) (0.038) (0.031) (0.052)  (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Precipitation -0.004** -0.004* -0.004** -0.004**  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Malaria (percentage -0.447 -0.367 -0.476* -0.484*  -0.030 -0.021 -0.031 -0.038 
       population at risk) (0.271) (0.280) (0.267) (0.267)  (0.045) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) 
Mean elevation 0.710***     0.087***    
      G-ECON (0.252)     (0.032)    
Absolute centroid   -0.001     -0.000   
     latitude  squared  (0.000)     (0.000)   
Mean Elevation   -0.000     -0.000  
    squared   (0.000)     (0.000)  
Temperature squared    0.000     0.000 
    (0.002)     (0.000) 
Constant -2.573* -1.841 -2.568* -2.502*  -0.297* -0.226 -0.335* -0.292* 
 (1.328) (1.376) (1.360) (1.315)  (0.171) (0.189) (0.174) (0.166) 
          
Continent FE no no no no  no no no no 
Observations 128 128 128 128  128 128 128 128 
R-squared 0.780 0.784 0.781 0.781  0.670 0.675 0.675 0.672 
Notes:  Columns (1) and (5) use a measure of mean elevation from G- ECON project (Nordhaus 2006). Columns (2) 
and (6) include the squared absolute latitude. Columns (3) and (7) include the squared mean elevation. Columns (4) 
and (8) include squared average temperature. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table D2. Robustness checks – Log (GDP) per capita in 2000 and Statehist.  
  Log (GDP) per capita in 2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Statehist  9.565*** 16.357*** 5.985** 7.306** 7.306** 
       (2.547) (4.402) (2.382) (2.867) (2.867) 
Statehist squared -6.609** -15.975*** -3.803 -4.791 -4.791 
      (2.746) (5.219) (2.926) (3.083) (3.083) 
State Age -0.663*** -1.892*** -0.434** -0.557*** -0.557*** 
 (0.195) (0.546) (0.186) (0.212) (0.212) 
Agyears  -0.480*** -0.040 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.171) (0.078) (0.083) (0.091) (0.091) 
Agyears squared  0.047***     
 (0.016)     
State Age   0.242***    
    squared  (0.087)    
Absolute centroid    -0.022   
    latitude   (0.031)   
Absolute centroid    0.001   
    latitude squared   (0.000)   
Distance from     -0.064  
   Addis Ababa    (0.110)  
Distance from     -0.001  
   Addis Ababa squared    (0.003)  
Predicted genetic     22.403 
    diversity     (73.470) 
Predicted genetic     -9.011 
    Diversity squared     (55.974) 
Constant 11.299*** 11.312*** 10.765*** 12.264*** 0.320 
 (1.459) (1.492) (1.545) (1.804) (24.057) 
      
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Continent FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 
R-squared 0.743 0.741 0.725 0.730 0.730 
Notes:  The variables “Distance from Addis Ababa” and “Predicted Genetic Diversity” are those constructed by 
Ashraf and Galor (2013). Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D3. State history, Log Population Density and Urbanization in 1 CE. 
        
Panel A  Log Population Density in 1 CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Statehist in 1 CE  4.350*** 8.417***  -1.237 1.270 2.754 4.553 
 (0.810) (1.837)  (2.175) (2.645) (1.874) (3.222) 
Statehist in 1 CE  -8.254***  0.880 -1.063 -3.034 -4.265 
      squared  (2.838)  (3.251) (4.258) (2.512) (3.322) 
Agyears in 1 CE   0.455*** 0.490*** 0.456*** 0.457*** 0.457*** 
   (0.040) (0.063) (0.079) (0.081) (0.084) 
Origtime in 1 CE     0.001 -0.016*** -0.010 
     (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) 
Origtime in 1 CE       -0.000 
     squared       (0.000) 
State Age in 1 CE       -0.213 
       (0.266) 
Constant -0.425*** -0.518*** -1.469*** -1.510*** -6.309*** -6.073*** -6.215*** 
 (0.140) (0.144) (0.159) (0.168) (1.267) (1.296) (1.270) 
        
Observations 135 135 130 130 115 115 115 
R-squared 0.154 0.182 0.455 0.458 0.717 0.800 0.803 
        
Panel B  Urbanization in 1 CE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Statehist in 1 CE  1.128*** 2.778***  0.599 0.235 1.312 1.500 
 (0.237) (0.624)  (0.723) (1.066) (0.958) (1.761) 
Statehist in 1 CE  -3.260***  -1.013 -0.576 -1.312 -1.452 
      squared  (1.045)  (1.117) (1.474) (1.164) (1.404) 
Agyears in 1 CE   0.101*** 0.093*** 0.077** -0.040 -0.039 
   (0.020) (0.027) (0.034) (0.039) (0.039) 
Origtime in 1 CE     0.004* -0.000 -0.001 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Origtime in 1 CE       0.000 
     squared       (0.000) 
State Age in 1 CE       -0.020 
       (0.191) 
Constant 2.566*** 2.533*** 2.348*** 2.354*** 1.592** 1.304 1.300 
 (0.064) (0.069) (0.100) (0.105) (0.759) (0.990) (0.989) 
        
Observations 128 128 128 128 125 125 125 
R-squared 0.063 0.087 0.139 0.141 0.371 0.526 0.526 
Controls no No no no yes yes yes 
Continent FE no No no no no yes yes 
Notes: In panel A, the dependent variable is log population density in 1 CE and the main independent variables are the 
extended statehist index between 3500 BCE and 1 CE, linear and squared. In panel B, the dependent variable is the 
urbanization rate in 1 CE and the main independent variables are the Statehist index between 3500 BCE and 1 CE, 
linear and squared. The data for historical population density is based on population data from McEvedy and 
Jones(1978) and land data from World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The data for urbanization rate in 1 CE 
is taken from Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010) and is based on Peregrine (2003) and takes three values: 1 if the 
largest settlement is smaller than 100 persons; 2 if it is between 100 and 399 persons; and 3 if it is larger than 400 
persons. The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator of whether the present-day country is landlocked, 
distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation, 
percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1
Table D4. State history and average technology adoption in 1 CE. Ancestry-Adjusted State history and 
technology adoption in 2000 CE 
Panel A 
 
Technology Adoption in 1 CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Statehist in 1 CE  0.762*** 1.695***  0.415 0.016 0.534 0.788 
       (0.122) (0.279)  (0.390) (0.519) (0.351) (0.601) 
Statehist in 1 CE  -1.842***  -0.524 -0.150 -0.691* -0.862* 
      squared  (0.479)  (0.572) (0.746) (0.412) (0.508) 
Agyears in 1 CE   0.064*** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.023 0.031* 
   (0.007) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Origtime in 1 CE     0.001 -0.002*** -0.005*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Origtime in 1 CE       0.000** 
     squared       (0.000) 
State Age in 1 CE       -0.026 
       (0.060) 
Constant 0.688*** 0.669*** 0.554*** 0.562*** -0.062 -0.123 -0.130 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.037) (0.039) (0.337) (0.332) (0.322) 
        
Observations 128 128 128 128 124 124 124 
R-squared 0.149 0.189 0.281 0.285 0.541 0.763 0.772 
Panel B  Technology Adoption  in 2000 CE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ancestry- Adjusted   0.233** 1.332***  1.329*** 0.794*** 0.672*** 0.787*** 
   Statehist in 1500 CE (0.092) (0.275)  (0.309) (0.215) (0.219) (0.223) 
Ancestry-Adjusted Statehist   -2.088***  -2.085*** -1.125*** -0.938*** -0.887*** 
   in 1500 CE squared  (0.513)  (0.514) (0.287) (0.317) (0.303) 
Agyears    0.011 -0.000 -0.010 -0.005 0.001 
   (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
Origtime      0.001* 0.001** 0.001 
     (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Origtime squared       0.000 
           (0.000) 
State Age        -0.029 
       (0.018) 
Constant 0.399*** 0.314*** 0.405*** 0.315*** 0.708*** 0.769*** 0.711*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.038) (0.033) (0.164) (0.207) (0.208) 
        
Observations 130 130 129 129 125 125 125 
R-squared 0.037 0.151 0.016 0.150 0.675 0.698 0.704 
Controls no no no no yes yes yes 
Continent FE no no no no no yes yes 
Notes: In panel A, the dependent variable is the technology adoption index in 1 CE and the main independent 
variables are the extended statehist index between 3500 BCE and 1 CE, linear and squared. In panel B , the dependent 
variable is the technology adoption index in 2000 CE and the main independent variables are the ancestry-adjusted 
extended statehist index, between 3500 BCE and 1500 CE, linear and squared. The list of controls includes: absolute 
latitude, an indicator of whether the present-day country is landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, 
land suitability, percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting 
malaria. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
  
Table D5. Robustness checks – Log (GDP) per capita in 2000 and ancestry-adjusted statehist.  
  Log (GDP) per capita in 2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ancestry- Adjusted  7.326*** 7.875*** 6.657*** 6.919*** 6.919*** 
      Statehist (1.724) (1.911) (1.890) (1.918) (1.918) 
Ancestry- Adjusted  -8.103*** -9.780*** -7.532*** -7.476*** -7.476*** 
      Statehist squared (2.286) (2.975) (2.365) (2.473) (2.473) 
State Age -0.334** -0.052 -0.017 -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.154) (0.079) (0.083) (0.088) (0.088) 
Agyears  -0.300** -0.583** -0.246* -0.322** -0.322** 
 (0.138) (0.247) (0.147) (0.154) (0.154) 
Agyears squared  0.029**     
 (0.014)     
State Age   0.071    
    squared  (0.049)    
Absolute Centroid    -0.032   
    Latitude   (0.032)   
Absolute Centroid    0.001   
    Latitude squared   (0.001)   
Distance from     0.007  
   Addis Ababa    (0.089)  
Distance from     -0.003  
   Addis Ababa 
squared 
   (0.003)  
Predicted Genetic     70.494 
    diversity     (60.738) 
Predicted Genetic     -46.137 
    Diversity squared     (46.088) 
Constant 10.416*** 10.380*** 9.861*** 11.160*** -15.763 
 (1.527) (1.578) (1.573) (1.789) (20.284) 
      
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Continent FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 
R-squared 0.737 0.732 0.733 0.734 0.734 
Notes: The variables “Distance from Addis Ababa” and “Predicted Genetic Diversity” are those constructed by Ashraf 
and Galor (2013).  Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table D6. Robustness checks – Technology adoption (excluding agriculture) in 1 CE and 1500 CE and statehist.  
Panel A Technology adoption in 1 C.E. excluding agriculture 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Statehist in 1 CE  2.012***  0.526 0.113 0.600 1.025 
       (0.328)  (0.464) (0.564) (0.391) (0.691) 
Statehist in 1 CE -2.179***  -0.650 -0.271 -0.799* -1.095* 
      squared (0.567)  (0.682) (0.821) (0.462) (0.587) 
Agyears in 1 CE  0.075*** 0.064*** 0.071*** 0.028 0.036* 
  (0.008) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
Origtime in 1 CE    0.001 -0.002*** -0.006*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Origtime in 1 CE      0.000* 
     squared      (0.000) 
State Age in 1 CE      -0.044 
      (0.069) 
Constant 0.604*** 0.469*** 0.480*** -0.152 -0.105 -0.115 
 (0.032) (0.041) (0.043) (0.391) (0.403) (0.397) 
       
Observations 128 128 128 124 124 124 
R-squared 0.201 0.293 0.298 0.577 0.759 0.768 
 Technology adoption in 1500 C.E. excluding agriculture 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Statehist in 1500   2.969***  1.747*** 1.783*** 1.019*** 1.549*** 
   CE  (0.386)  (0.484) (0.339) (0.197) (0.447) 
Statehist in 1500 -3.524***  -2.684*** -2.015*** -0.728** -0.857*** 
   CE squared (0.797)  (0.948) (0.643) (0.322) (0.295) 
Agyears in 1500   0.107*** 0.076*** 0.041*** -0.000 0.004 
   CE  (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) 
Origtime in 1500     0.001** -0.001* 0.001 
   CE    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Origtime in 1500       -0.000* 
    CE  squared      (0.000) 
State Age in 1500       -0.071 
   CE      (0.055) 
Constant 0.169*** -0.013 -0.007 -0.042 0.031 -0.053 
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.039) (0.266) (0.149) (0.161) 
       
Observations 111 109 109 107 107 107 
R-squared 0.498 0.510 0.589 0.813 0.915 0.922 
Controls no no no yes yes yes 
Continent FE no no no no yes yes 
Notes: The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator whether the modern-day country is landlocked, 
distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation, 
percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
  
Table D7. State history and Log Population Density in 1 CE and 1500 CE – linear relationship. 
       
Panel A Log Population Density in 1 CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Statehist in 1 CE  4.350***  -0.734 0.583 0.793 0.614 
 (0.810)  (0.861) (1.097) (0.811) (1.025) 
Agyears in 1 CE  0.455*** 0.484*** 0.466*** 0.481*** 0.463*** 
  (0.040) (0.057) (0.068) (0.078) (0.083) 
Origtime in 1 CE    0.001 -0.016*** -0.008 
    (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) 
Origtime in 1 CE      -0.000 
     squared      (0.000) 
State Age in 1 CE      0.031 
      (0.184) 
Constant -0.425*** -1.469*** -1.507*** -6.369*** -6.193*** -6.262*** 
 (0.140) (0.159) (0.167) (1.281) (1.297) (1.282) 
       
Controls no no no yes yes yes 
Continent FE no no no no yes yes 
Observations 135 130 130 115 115 115 
R-squared 0.154 0.455 0.458 0.717 0.798 0.799 
       
Panel B Log Population Density in 1500 CE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Statehist in 1500   3.883***  0.902 3.653*** 3.605*** 6.072*** 
   CE  (0.670)  (0.957) (0.943) (0.915) (1.803) 
Agyears in 1500   0.315*** 0.269*** 0.180*** 0.115* 0.169** 
   CE  (0.042) (0.064) (0.064) (0.069) (0.069) 
Origtime in 1500     0.006** -0.003 -0.017 
   CE    (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) 
Origtime in 1500       0.000 
    CE  squared      (0.000) 
State Age in 1500       -0.334* 
   CE      (0.180) 
Constant 0.359** -0.411* -0.345 -2.761* -3.271** -3.382*** 
 (0.144) (0.212) (0.223) (1.487) (1.343) (1.258) 
       
Controls no no no yes yes yes 
Continent FE no no no no yes yes 
Observations 154 147 147 128 128 128 
R-squared 0.184 0.269 0.273 0.687 0.759 0.770 
     Notes: The data for historical population density is based on population data from McEvedy and Jones(1978) and 
land data from World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an 
indicator whether the modern-day country is landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, 
percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table D8. State history and urbanization in 1 CE and 1500 CE – linear relationship 
       
Panel A Urbanization in 1 CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Statehist in 1 CE  1.128***  0.003 -0.135 0.475 0.170 
       (0.237)  (0.232) (0.360) (0.313) (0.728) 
Agyears in 1 CE  0.101*** 0.101*** 0.082*** -0.030 -0.037 
  (0.020) (0.025) (0.028) (0.039) (0.039) 
Origtime in 1 CE    0.004* -0.000 0.000 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Origtime in 1 CE      -0.000 
     squared      (0.000) 
State Age in 1 CE      0.063 
      (0.154) 
Constant 2.566*** 2.348*** 2.348*** 1.560** 1.260 1.285 
 (0.064) (0.100) (0.104) (0.755) (0.995) (0.984) 
       
Controls no no no yes yes yes 
Continent FE no no no no yes yes 
Observations 128 128 128 125 125 125 
R-squared 0.063 0.139 0.139 0.371 0.523 0.524 
       
Panel B Urbanization in 1500 CE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Statehist in 1500   16.678***  18.666*** 22.878*** 21.837*** 30.860* 
   CE  (2.384)  (3.452) (6.078) (7.446) (16.414) 
Agyears in 1500   0.761*** -0.201 -0.135 -0.598 -0.411 
   CE  (0.177) (0.239) (0.356) (0.474) (0.472) 
Origtime in 1500     -0.052 -0.070* -0.141 
   CE    (0.036) (0.041) (0.131) 
Origtime in 1500       0.001 
    CE  squared      (0.001) 
State Age in 1500       -1.256 
   CE      (1.693) 
Constant 4.487*** 3.633*** 5.119*** -7.853 -7.314 -8.246 
 (0.569) (1.019) (1.015) (8.277) (8.019) (8.291) 
       
Controls no no no yes yes yes 
Continent FE no no no no yes yes 
Observations 83 83 83 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.278 0.111 0.282 0.386 0.458 0.467 
Notes: The data for urbanization rate in 1 CE is taken from Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010) and is based on Peregrine 
(2003) and takes three values: 1 if the largest settlement is smaller than 100 persons; 2 if it is between 100 and 399 
persons; and 3 if it is larger than 400 persons.  The data for urbanization rate at 1500 CE is that reported by Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2005), defined as the percentage of a country’s total population residing in urban areas (each with 
a city population size of at least 5,000). The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator whether the modern-
day country is landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable land, 
temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table D9. State history and average technology adoption in 1 CE and 1500 CE - linear relationship 
       
Panel A Technology Adoption in 1 CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Statehist in 1 CE  0.762***  0.106 -0.080 0.093 -0.001 
       (0.122)  (0.122) (0.196) (0.134) (0.246) 
Agyears in 1 CE  0.064*** 0.059*** 0.065*** 0.028** 0.032* 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) 
Origtime in 1 CE    0.001 -0.002*** -0.005*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Origtime in 1 CE      0.000* 
     squared      (0.000) 
State Age in 1 CE      0.023 
      (0.048) 
Constant 0.688*** 0.554*** 0.559*** -0.071 -0.147 -0.139 
 (0.027) (0.037) (0.039) (0.332) (0.329) (0.320) 
       
Controls no no no yes yes yes 
Continent FE no no no no yes yes 
Observations 128 128 128 124 124 124 
R-squared 0.149 0.281 0.283 0.541 0.759 0.769 
       
Panel B Technology Adoption  in 1500 CE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Statehist in 1500   
1.227***  0.288 0.754*** 0.684*** 1.140*** 
   CE  (0.157)  (0.193) (0.172) (0.135) (0.353) 
Agyears in 1500   0.104*** 0.088*** 0.042*** -0.000 0.004 
   CE  (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
Origtime in 1500     0.001 -0.001** 0.001 
   CE    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Origtime in 1500       -0.000 
    CE  squared      (0.000) 
State Age in 1500       -0.070 
   CE      (0.047) 
Constant 0.315*** 0.065* 0.090** -0.143 0.026 -0.062 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.037) (0.258) (0.170) (0.180) 
       
Controls no no no yes yes yes 
Continent FE no no no no yes yes 
Observations 112 110 110 107 107 107 
R-squared 0.389 0.532 0.541 0.776 0.897 0.904 
Notes: The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator whether the modern-day country is landlocked, 
distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation, percentage 
population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table D10. State history, ancestry-adjusted state history and technology adoption in 2000 CE – linear relationship 
       
Panel A Technology Adoption in 2000 CE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Statehist 0.086  -0.074 0.063 0.128 0.289* 
    (0.095)  (0.132) (0.106) (0.106) (0.174) 
Agyears   0.011 0.015 -0.008 -0.008 -0.000 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
Origtime     0.000 0.001** 0.001 
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Origtime squared      -0.000 
           (0.000) 
State Age       -0.032 
      (0.021) 
Constant 0.430*** 0.405*** 0.406*** 0.761*** 0.818*** 0.791*** 
 (0.029) (0.038) (0.038) (0.162) (0.206) (0.206) 
       
Controls no no no yes yes yes 
Continent FE no no no no yes yes 
Observations 130 129 129 125 125 125 
R-squared 0.006 0.016 0.018 0.639 0.679 0.684 
Panel B Technology Adoption in 2000 CE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ancestry-Adjusted   0.233**  0.231 0.215* 0.194* 0.354** 
   Statehist in 1500 CE (0.092)  (0.156) (0.121) (0.115) (0.161) 
Agyears   0.011 -0.000 -0.013 -0.011 -0.003 
  (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Origtime     0.000 0.001** 0.001 
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Origtime squared      0.000 
          (0.000) 
State Age       -0.034* 
      (0.018) 
Constant 0.399*** 0.405*** 0.401*** 0.754*** 0.790*** 0.721*** 
 (0.023) (0.038) (0.035) (0.162) (0.203) (0.204) 
       
Controls no no no yes yes yes 
Continent FE no no no no yes yes 
Observations 130 129 129 125 125 125 
R-squared 0.037 0.016 0.036 0.649 0.683 0.690 
Notes: The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator whether the modern-day country is landlocked, 
distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation, percentage 
population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
